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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs who enter the litigation process expect to incur certain
costs-primarily time and money. Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, promulgated in 1938, requires that "[i]n the complaint
the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties."' This
imposes an additional burden upon plaintiffs-accountability for the al-
legations that they bring forth. In this era of widespread electronic dis-
semination of information, however, Rule 10(a) imposes a cost that could
not have been foreseen in 1938-an invasion of privacy. The burden of
this new expense is shared by both plaintiffs and society alike, as a result
of a judicial system that often appears to value openness at any price.
The time has come, therefore, for a more liberal approach to pseudony-
mous plaintiffs.
2
The need to provide claimant anonymity has been recognized in the
criminal context in the form of rape shield laws, but plaintiff privacy
concerns play a role in civil cases as well. For example, many relatives
of victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks3 brought suit
against several airlines, claiming that the negligence of those airlines
* Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School;
B.S., Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. My
thanks and gratitude to Patricia Biswanger, Dana Brakman-Reiser, Ted Janger, Claire Kelly and Paul
Schwartz for their suggestions and comments on previous drafts of this Article, and to Meghan
Douris, Danielle Feman, John Hermanowski, and Jason Litwack for their invaluable research assis-
tance. I am particularly indebted to the indefatigable Albert Wan, without whom this Article could
not have been completed. I am also grateful to Dean Joan Wexler for her generous support of this
project through the Brooklyn Law School Research Stipend. Finally, I could not have written this
Article without the advice and encouragement of my husband, Ken Rose, who throughout this en-
deavor only twice told me how glad he is that he didn't go to law school.
I. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a).
2. 1 use the words "pseudonymous," "anonymous," "fictitious," and their grammatical varia-
tions interchangeably.
3. For a description of the "worst international terrorist attack ever," see United States Dep't
of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism-2001, http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/I 0288.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
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contributed to the deaths of their loved ones.4 Many of the victims' rela-
tives, grieving and wary of publicity, sought to pursue their claims
anonymously.5 Judge Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York
denied their request, stating that the societal interest in the openness of
the judicial system outweighed any privacy interests that the plaintiffs
had in remaining anonymous. 6 Anguished families were forced to bear
not only the loss of a loved one, but also an invasion of privacy in order
to vindicate their rights.
7
Concerns about privacy are not a new social phenomenon. Brandeis
and Warren's unease at the turn of the century regarding loss of privacy
was prompted by the technological and media developments of their
time. 8 First, the development of a new form of sensationalist journalism,
known as yellow journalism, made newspapers wildly successful and led
to dramatically increased circulation. 9 Second, technological develop-
ments, specifically photography, caused "great alarm for privacy.''l
Brandeis and Warren "astutely recognized the potential for the new tech-
nology of cameras to be used by the sensationalistic press."" Their con-
cern resulted in the 1890 publication of their seminal article, The Right to
Privacy, in which they argued that then-existing law did not "afford[] a
principle which [could] properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the
individual; and, if it [did], what the nature and extent of such protection
[was].' Concluding that available legal principles were inadequate,
Brandeis and Warren argued for the creation of a new right of privacy.13
The Internet and related technological advancements may very well
constitute the yellow journalism of the new millennium. Information can
be circulated and accessed rapidly and inexpensively on the Internet.
Both the common law and statutory privacy law of the present era, as in
4. See, e.g., Mark Hamblett, 9/11 Victims' Suits Flood Court to Meet One-Year Time Limit:
Uncertainty Over Compensation Fund Leads Hundreds to File Claims, 228 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Sept. 11,
2002).
5. See 9/11 Families Cannot Be Anonymous in Suits, 228 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Sept. 20, 2002).
6. Id.
7. In the recent Kobe Bryant civil trial, Byrant's accuser sought to remain anonymous, claim-
ing that she had been the subject of death threats and sordid publicity. Judge Matsch of the United
States District Court of Colorado denied the accuser's request, saying that to permit her "to remain
anonymous could be misconstrued as a prejudgment in her favor." Bryant Accuser's Name to Be
Public, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2004, at A2.
8. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 3 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter SOLOVE & ROTENBERG].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 4.
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Brandeis and Warren's day, provide little or no recourse against the dis-
seminators of private information collected from various sources. The
danger of the Internet is compounded because new techniques for data
aggregation can be combined with electronic court records to form a
massive assault on information privacy that the emphasis on judicial
openness does not recognize and which privacy law does little to remedy.
There is a growing clash between the loss of personal privacy and court
procedures that are antiquated in dealing with plaintiff pseudonymity
requests.
Indeed, efforts by would-be plaintiffs to pursue their claims pseudo-
nymously have grown significantly.14 Furthermore, as of July 1, 2003,
Virginia's legislature codified the current ineffective methods that have
been followed by the federal courts in deciding to whom permission to
proceed anonymously should be granted.
15
This Article explores the current tension between modem-day pri-
vacy concerns and the traditional emphasis on judicial openness, as it
relates to plaintiffs wishing to pursue their claims pseudonymously. I
suggest that an increase in the use of pseudonymity for plaintiffs with
particular privacy concerns is the appropriate means to counteract mod-
em technological privacy invasions. In Part II of the article, I examine
the impact of technology on privacy and explore its role in the changing
face of modern litigation. Part III considers the nature of privacy and
assesses the constitutional and statutory basis for modem privacy rights.
Part IV reviews the historical basis of judicial openness and challenges
much of the reasoning behind it. Part V examines and criticizes the often
outdated and non-technologically-aware, non-Internet-responsive justifi-
cations for the denial of plaintiff pseudonymity. In Part VI, I trace the
development of the five-factor test employed by most courts today when
14. A Westlaw search, run in the allcases database on December 16, 2004, of Doe plaintiffs
(ti(doe +3 "v")) for the year 1973 yielded thirty-six results; for 1983 yielded sixty-two results; and
for 2003 yielded 155 results. These figures do not include pseudonymous plaintiffs labeled as "Roe"
or "Poe" or any other variation thereof, nor do they include plaintiffs who brought actions using
initials. Of course, however, the number of reported cases grew during that time as well.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-15.1 (Michie 2004). This legislation permits a party to move for an
order to participate anonymously in a proceeding and lists the factors that the court is to consider in
determining whether anonymity can be maintained. Id. These factors are:
[W]hether the requested anonymity is intended merely to avoid the annoyance and criti-
cism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a sensitive and highly per-
sonal matter; whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to
the requesting party or to innocent nonparties; the ages of the persons whose privacy in-
terests are sought to be protected; whether the action is against a governmental or private
party; and the risk of unfairness to other parties if anonymity is maintained.
Id. Illinois has a similar provision. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-401(e) (2003) ("Upon application
and for good cause shown the parties may appear under fictitious names").
2004]
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evaluating whether plaintiffs' privacy concerns warrant pseudonymity. I
propose changes to the existing criteria courts use to determine which
plaintiffs should be permitted to bring their actions pseudonymously, and
I recommend additional criteria that should be examined when evaluat-
ing such requests.
I conclude the Article with a pair of recommendations: (1) that,
when evaluating plaintiffs' pseudonymity requests, courts respond to the
role that technology plays in diminishing privacy in modem society; and
(2) that the responsibility for considering plaintiffs' privacy concerns and
requests for pseudonymity be delegated to specialized judges or magis-
trates. The goal of these changes is to protect against a chilling effect on
the administration of justice by providing plaintiffs with freer access to
pseudonymity protection in the face of technological encroachment upon
their privacy.
II. MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND Loss OF PRIVACY
Fears of identity theft, bans on photograph-taking cell phones, and
the promulgation of laws intended to promote privacy, such as the pri-
vacy provisions in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA), reflect the growing awareness that technology has
great potential to infringe upon what we consider to be private spheres.' 6
Indeed, recent surveys show that Americans feel that the government has
too much access to personal information.' 7 More than three-quarters of
survey participants stated they believe that it is important both to be in
control of who can get personal information and to trust those with
whom they share confidential information. 8 Another survey, by the An-
nenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania,
revealed that only thirteen percent of American adults who use the Inter-
net at home trust that the government will help them protect private in-
16. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Security Check, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 2002, at 11.
17. For the results of an August 2002 telephone survey of 1,000 adults conducted by the Center
for Survey Research & Analysis at the University of Connecticut in which eighty-one percent of the
respondents reported that the right to privacy was "essential," see Electronic Privacy Information
Center Public Opinion and Privacy Page (reporting the results of various public opinion polls on the
issue of privacy rights in America), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/#polls (last visited Dec.
16, 2004).
18. Humphrey Taylor, Most People Are "Privacy Pragmatists " Who, While Concerned About
Privacy, Will Sometimes Trade It Off For Other Benefits, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Mar. 19, 2003)
(reporting the results of a February 2003 Harris telephone survey of 1,010 adults on the public's
concern of an erosion of privacy), at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harrisjpoll/
index.asp?PID=365 (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
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formation online while not disclosing personal information without per-
mission.19
Court records are one form of information that can now be collected
easily and inexpensively from virtually anywhere, due to electronic filing
in the federal courts. 20 This information is also easily accessible in state
courts. 21 Not only are complaints and answers filed and stored electroni-
cally and therefore accessible to anyone with an Internet connection, so
are the motions and briefs that follow. In addition, the exhibits that ac-
company those filings frequently are scanned into the court's database
and made available to the public for electronic retrieval. 22 These docu-
ments contain averments, some true, some not, some supported, some
unsupported, some rational, some hyperbolic, but almost all are protected
by the wide swath of judicial protection that allows a litigant to say al-
most anything in the pursuit of what she perceives to be justice.23
19. Joseph Turow, Americans and Online Privacy: The System Is Broken 5 (June 2003), at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/0 4 info society/2003_online_privacyversion_09.pdf
(last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
20. See, e.g., PACER Service Center Homepage ("The PACER Service Center is the Federal
Judiciary's centralized registration, billing, and technical support center for electronic access to U.S.
District, Bankruptcy, and Appellate court records."), at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov (last visited
Dec. 16, 2004).
21. "Those who are curious about the rape case against Kobe Bryant ... need only click on a
couple of links on the web site of the Colorado court system to see hundred [sic] of legal filings."
Adam Liptak, Kobe's Accuser, Internet Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2004, § 4, at 5.
22. One popular website, http://thesmokinggun.com, is dedicated to publicizing the legal affairs
of celebrities and other notables. The cite provides images of court documents and mug shots.
There is even a prize contest in which viewers compete by examining an image of a legal document
and guessing what is written beneath the "red box" that the proprietors of the website have placed
over a portion of the document. The contest that ran at the end of February 2004, which has since
been replaced by other contests, included an affidavit from what appeared to be an investigator who
had inventoried the contents of the Unabomber's Montana shack. Readers were asked to guess what
the Unabomber had left there in a jar. The prizes offered included "The Simpsons Hit and Run
video game" and a deck of "nifty celebrity mug shot playing cards." http://thesmokinggun.com (last
visited Dec. 16, 2004).
23. The doctrine of judicial privilege holds that communications pertinent to any stage of judi-
cial proceedings are afforded an absolute privilege that cannot be destroyed by abuse. See, e.g.,
Hagendorf v. Brown, 699 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[California law] makes privileged those
publications made in a judicial proceeding. The privilege is absolute and unaffected by the presence
of malice.") (footnote omitted); O'Brien v. Alexander, 898 F. Supp. 162, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("'[ln the context of a legal proceeding, statements by parties and their attorneys are absolutely
privileged if, by any view or under any circumstances, they are pertinent to the litigation."' (quoting
Grasso v. Mathew, 564 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578 (App. Div. 1991))); Binder v. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc., 275
A.2d 53, 56 (Pa. 1971) ("All communications pertinent to any stage of a judicial proceeding are
accorded an absolute privilege which cannot be destroyed by abuse.").
Thus, all statements made and all conduct occurring within the course and scope of judicial proceed-
ings-and any and all conduct or communications occurring prior to the judicial proceedings, pro-
vided that this conduct has some relation to the proceedings-are absolutely privileged, and attor-
neys, judges, parties and witnesses are not subject to tort liability for such statements or conduct.
See, e.g., Hagendorf, 699 F.2d at 480; O'Brien, 898 F. Supp. at 171; Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351,
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These records can be combined with information that is easily ob-
tained by even the most casual Internet sleuth. An enormous wealth of
data on an individual can be collected in a matter of minutes. 24 Informa-
tion drawn from public records often consists of fairly innocuous details,
including one's height, weight, birth date, address, and telephone num-
ber.25  If one has access to special databases-and this access is fairly
easy to get, in most instances-an interested party can ascertain a liti-
gant's credit history, occupation, debt burden, and income. 6  By
"Googling" an individual's name,27 much more can often be learned, in-
cluding educational background, civic involvement, and anything that
has been deemed newsworthy by some editor at some point.28  This in-
formation creates what one scholar refers to as a "digital biography,"
which is "an unauthorized biography, only partially true and very reduc-
tive."29
To the digital biography one can now add the information available
in a lawsuit. The digital biography of a litigant may or may not square
with reality.3 Moreover, the subject of the digital biography may not
355 (Pa. 1986); Brown v. Del. Valley Transplant Program, 539 A.2d 1372, 1374-75 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988).
24. See, e.g., Forfeiting Privacy Will Destroy the Essence of America, DETROIT NEWS, Edi-
toral, June 22, 2003, at A18.
25. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitu-
tion, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1137, 1184 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Access and Aggregation].
26. See, e.g., Catherine Brennan, Credit Reports Not So Secret, DAILY RECORD (Baltimore,
Md.), Dec. 29, 1995, at 1; Shelley Emling, Electronic Break-Ins Open Up Private Files, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Nov. 5, 1994, at B6; Brue Mohl, Firm Barred from Selling, Collecting Financial Data,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2004, at C2.
27. "Googling" is defined as "[t]o search for information on the Web, particularly by using the
Google search engine; to search the Web for information related to a new or potential girlfriend or
boyfriend." The Word Spy, ("The Word Spy" is described as a website "devoted to lexpionage, the
sleuthing of new words and phrases."), at http://www.wordspy.com/words/google.asp (last visited
Dec. 16, 2004).
28. In February 2004, a New York woman made international news for "Googling" the name of
a potential date only to discover that there was an FBI warrant out for his arrest in connection with
his activities in Cincinnati. Her Google search led the police to his capture and arrest. Google Ar-
rest, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS (New Zealand), Feb. 2, 2004. And recently a detective with the Wash-
ington State Patrol searched Google to successfully determine the identity of a victim of a hit-and-
run accident found more than 1,600 miles from the victim's home eleven years earlier. Mike Barber,
1993 Hit-Run Victim is Finally Identified, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 9, 2004, at B 1.
29. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 25, at 1188.
30. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 8, at 19. At least one scholar would argue that a digital
biography can never be entirely accurate.
True knowledge of another person is the culmination of a slow process of mu-
tual revelation .... When intimate personal information circulates among a
small group of people who know us well, its significance can be weighed
against other aspects of our personality and character. By contrast, when in-
timate information is removed from its original context and revealed to
strangers, we are vulnerable to being misjudged on the basis of our most em-
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wish to share all such information with the public, especially when, in
the aggregate, it is misleading, or even outright false, or deleterious to
one's reputation.31 The contents of a digital biography could easily go
well beyond the contours of a plaintiffs complaint to illuminate aspects
of a plaintiff s life that are not at issue in her action.
In addition, few would dispute that modem technology has changed
the face of litigation. Only a few years ago the IBM Selectric typewriter
was the state-of-the-art drafting device for all pleadings and discovery.
32
Although the process of legal drafting33 became fairly standardized with
respect to format 34 -and to a lesser extent substance-a well-drafted le-
gal document was often the result of an exhaustive process. 35 Even with
the increased usage of pre-printed forms, the electric typewriter was not
conducive to the efficient drafting of legal documents that invariably in-
barrassing, and therefore most memorable, tastes and preferences. . . . In a
world in which citizens are bombarded with information, people form impres-
sions quickly, based on sound bites, and these impressions are likely to over-
simplify and misrepresent our complicated and often contradictory characters.
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8-9 (2000).
31. Similarly, Lessig sees modem data collection creating problems of manipulation. LAW-
RENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 154 (1999). Manipulation of individuals
through data collection occurs because "profiles will begin to normalize the population from which
the norm is drawn." Id. As Lessig writes, "[tihe system watches what you do; it fits you into a
pattern; the pattern is then fed back to you in the form of options set by the pattern; the options rein-
force the pattern; the cycle begins again." Id. As one scholar explains this concept, "[iun other
words, initial examples of our behavior will be used to press us into a mold." Paul M. Schwartz,
Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Informa-
tion Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743, 747 (2000). According to Schwartz, Lessig describes a risk
to autonomy. Id This point is similar to the one made herein regarding data aggregation and digital
biography that create a misleading profile of an individual, thereby robbing him of his individuality
and autonomy.
32. See IBM ARCHIVES: DOCUMENTS, IBM HIGHLIGHTS, 1885-1969 (describing the IBM
Selectric as "an electric typewriter which uses a golf-ball shaped typing element rather than type
bars or moveable carriages"), at http://www-l.ibm.com/ibmihistory/documents/pdf/1885-1
9 6 9
.pdf
(last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
33. Legal drafting has been defined as "the crystallization and expression in definitive form of a
legal right, privilege, function, duty, or status." REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
DRAFTING 4 (1965). Further distinguishing legal drafting from "ordinary composition" a commenta-
tor has stated that legal drafting "is free from all colour, from all emotion, from all rhetoric.... It
says in the plainest language, with the simplest, fewest, and fittest words, precisely what it means."
J.G. MacKay, Introduction to an Essay on the Art of Legal Composition Commonly Called Drafting,
3 L. Q. REv. 326 (1887), reprinted in LEGAL DRAFTING 16 (Robert N. Cook ed., 1951).
34. See BARBARA CHILD, DRAFTING LEGAL DOCUMENTS: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 13
(1988) (predicting that "[a]s states begin to operate more fully on the theory that the purpose of
pleadings is merely to give notice to the opposing party, pleadings become more fully reduced to a
matter of filling out a form").
35. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 33, at 36-54 (enumerating and describing the many steps
involved in legal drafting); THOMAS R. HAGGARD, LEGAL DRAFTING IN A NUTSHELL 21-35 (1996)
(providing an overview of the legal drafting process).
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volved revisions, sometimes five or six times over.36 One can imagine
the countless frustrations and prolonged hours often exerted in drafting,
with an electric typewriter, a single legal document.
Computerized word-processing technology replaced manual typing
and all its tedium and frustration, 37 but the documents generated on a
computer still had to be photocopied, then filed with the court and served
on opposing counsel. Anyone who wished access to the pleadings would
have to visit the courthouse; anyone who wanted to see other unfiled
documents, such as discovery materials, would have to ask one of the
parties.
Modem litigation changed dramatically, however, with the introduc-
tion of electronic filing and the systemic use of the Internet by the federal
courts. By the year 2000, the federal judiciary had undertaken an initia-
tive to modernize and expand the capabilities of its electronic case man-
38agement systems. According to the Judicial Conference of the United
States, modernization and expansion of electronic case management was
intended to "improve access to court dockets and case files for judges,
court employees, litigants, and the public by allowing remote, instanta-
neous, and simultaneous around-the-clock electronic access to records,
resulting in fast and reliable service. ' ' 9  By mail ballot distributed on
September 13, 2001,40 the twenty-seven members of the conference
adopted policies that govern the electronic availability of federal court
case-file information.4 1 Among other things, the conference agreed that
36. DICKERSON, supra note 33, at 45 ("The number of drafts required is a function of the diffi-
culties of the immediate problem and the skill and experience of the draftsman").
37. For example, the website of the LawOfficeSuperStore states that "[tihe word processor is
the most important software application that a law firm can have." LawOfficeSuperStore.com, Law
Office Software 101, at http://www.lawofficesuperstore.com/images/pdf/lawofficel01.pdf (last
visited Dec. 16, 2004).
38. LEONADIS RALPH MEACHAM, DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S.
COURTS-THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE OPTIMAL UTILIZATION OF JUDI-
CIAL RESOURCES 10 (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/optimal2001 
.pdf (last visited
Dec. 16, 2004).
39. Id. The report also stated that "[t]he systems also will enhance the collection and retrieval
of statistics." Id.
40. On the morning of September 11, 2001, the Chief Justice of the United States had convened
the 141st session of the Judicial Conference when, as the Court became aware of the terrorist attacks
on Washington and New York, the Court was evacuated and the Conference session was suspended.
When it became apparent that it would be difficult to reschedule the meeting, the Chief Justice sent a
memo to the members of the Conference advising them that the best course as to resolve obviously
time-sensitive matters by mail ballot and put off until March 2002 other, less-timely issues. The
ballot was sent to Conference members on September 13, 2001. Press Release, Administrative Of-
fice of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Approves Recommendations on Electronic Case File
Availability and Internet Use (Sept. 19, 2001), http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/jc90la.pdf
(last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
41. Id.
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documents should be made available electronically to the same extent
that they are available at the courthouse, with the exception of Social
Security cases. The members of the conference also required that "per-
sonal identifiers," i.e. Social Security numbers, dates of birth, financial
account numbers, and the names of minor children, be modified or re-
dacted.42
Electronic accessing of federal court files has been enthusiastically
received by all constituencies, including the judiciary, law firms, librar-
ies, government agencies, corporations and individuals. 43  In 1995,
PACER 44 accounts-held "by law firms, libraries, government agencies,
corporations, and individuals-totaled 20,028." 4 "By the end of 1998,
the total had grown to 2 9 ,4 0 8. A6 But by September 2003, there were
more than 270,000 PACER accounts.47 In the October 2003 edition of a
website geared toward "journalists, future journalists, and teachers of
journalists,"4 readers were encouraged to sign up for PACER and use it
42. See News Release, U.S. Courts-the Federal Judiciary, Federal Judiciary Newsroom, Fund-
ing and Elecronic Access Top Judicial Conference Agenda (stating that PACER allows the public to
access electronic dockets and court documents), http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/
judconf031604.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2004); see also Few Negatives Reported on Electronic
Access to Criminal Files, THE THIRD BRANCH-NEWSLETER OF THE FED. COURTS (U.S. Courts-
The Fed. Judiciary, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2003 (requiring reduction of certain material from
documents before the public can view them), http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/oct03ttb/
negatives/index.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
43. See generally Service Center Ensures PACER Reliability During "Unbelievable "Growth in
Public's Use, THE THIRD BRANCH-NEWSLETTER OF THE FED. COURTS (U.S. Courts-The Fed.
Judiciary, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2003, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/sep03ttb/pacer/index.html
(last visited Dec. 16, 2004) [hereinafter PACER, Unbelievable Growth].
44. PACER is the acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records. Press Release,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Available Soon: Instant Registration for PACER System
(Nov. 25, 2003), http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/instantpacerl 12503.pdf (last visited Dec.
16, 2004).
45. PACER, Unbelievable Growth, supra note 43. About seventy percent of all PACER us-
age-16 million pages of usage per month in 2001-is generated by the bankruptcy courts. Elec-
tronic Access to Bankruptcy Courts Boon to Public, THE THIRD BRANCH-NEWSLETTER OF THE FED.
JUDICIARY (U.S. Courts-The Fed. Judiciary), Sept. 2002, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/sep02ttb/
electronic.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
46. PACER, Unbelievable Growth, supra note 43. PACER initially offered public access to
court docket sheets only, "but the advent of a new case management system that allows courts to
manage electronic dockets has provided access to actual court documents as well." Id. PACER now
"offers electronic access to case file documents, listings of all case parties, reports of case-related
information, chronologies of events entered in the case record, claims registries, listings of new
bankruptcy cases, judgments or case status, and a nationwide party/case index." Id.
47. Id.
48. The Poynter Institute bills itself as "a school for journalists, future journalists, and teachers
of journalists." See Poynteronline-About Poynter, Poynter Institute Mission Statement (July 8,
2004) (describing the purpose of the Poynter Institute as well as the services and personnel associ-
ated with Poynter) at http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id= 6 2 (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
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as part of their reporting. 49 State courts are sure to follow suit-indeed,
the New York state court system recently announced that it plans "to be-
gin making criminal and civil legal records available on the
Internet.
' 50
Electronic access to court documents is part of a larger phenomenon
of records that federal, state, and local governments keep about their citi-
zens. These records can easily be searched and obtained from almost
any location and touch upon just about every aspect of citizens' lives. As
Daniel Solove describes the phenomenon:
Until recently, public records were difficult to access. For a long time,
public records were only available locally. Finding information about a
person often involved a treasure hunt around the country to a series of
local offices to dig up records. But with the Internet revolution, public
records can be easily obtained and searched from anywhere. Once scat-
tered about the country, now public records are consolidated by private
sector entities into gigantic databases.51
Court records are thus just one type of record easily available to
computer users. By simply "Googling" an individual, or by employing
one of the many private companies that collect and sell data on individu-
als,52 one can discover a wealth of information.
The types of data available are mind-boggling: credit files, work
history, driving records, health reports, bank balances, nonpublished
phone numbers, phone records, criminal convictions, Social Security
earnings, family makeup, personal tastes and buying habits.
Enterprising marketers, and most anyone with a computer and the
required fee, can purchase general information from original sources,
such as credit or government agencies. And though they won't sell the
most sensitive information to just anyone, there are dozens of informa-
tion resellers, known as superbureaus, that often will.
The worst thing about this information blitzkrieg is that--even
though errors abound-what's said about us by computers is usually
49. See Jonathan Dube, Poynteronline, Court Data Online (Oct. 16, 2003) (discussing the bene-
fits and accessability of PACER), at http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id=32&aid=51371 (last
visited Dec. 16, 2004).
50. Susan Saulny, Court Records a Click Away? Yes. With Some Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2004, at B4.
5 1. Solove, Access andAggregation, supra note 25, at 1139.
52. See, e.g., US SEARCH, About US SEARCH (branding itself the "Leader in Public Informa-
tion Since 1994," US SEARCH uses its "patented Darwin technology and access to billions of records
. . . [to] provide[] the best results to both consumers and Fortune 1000 companies."), at
http://www.ussearch.com/consumer/commerce/about/about-us.jsp (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
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considered accurate, and significant decisions are made based on this
information. Often those affected are unaware of the process and are
given no chance to offer explanations.53
In spite of the threat to privacy presented by the Internet, electronic
technology and increased media publicity of court proceedings,54 and
despite rising and well-founded fears of eroding privacy, courts have
been reluctant to permit plaintiffs to sue under pseudonyms, stating that
to do so hampers the societal interest in open judicial proceedings.
These courts presume, often without explanation, that pseudonymous
plaintiffs and open judicial proceedings are by definition mutually exclu-
sive.55 These courts also implicitly assume that open judicial proceedings
are a per se good, without exception or qualification. This is not neces-
sarily true. Reluctance to permit pseudonymous plaintiffs stifles the judi-
cial process, forcing some plaintiffs to choose to forgo their claims in the
name of protecting their privacy. Conversely, recognition by the courts
of the erosion of personal privacy caused by electronic technology and
by the media, resulting in the freer use of plaintiff pseudonymity, will
resolve this problem without any significant downside. As one author
aptly noted, "the law must structure the use of personal information so
that individuals will be free from state or community intimidation that
would destroy their involvement in the democratic life of the commu-
nity. ' 56
53. Jeffrey Rothfeder, Dangerous Things Strangers Know About You, MCCALL'S, Jan. 1994, at
88.
54. See, e.g., Yvonne Barlow, Poll Shows Concerns About Simpson Trial: Texans Suggest
Judge Should Ban TV Cameras from LA Courtroom, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 30, 1994, at
12A (reporting that "[s]eventy-three percent of Texans surveyed said they thought the intense media
coverage of the trial would affect the jury's verdict"); Jon Bruschke & Erin Powers, Muddying the
Jury Pool, 25 NAT'L L.J. 26, May 19, 2003 (inquiring into the effect of pretrial publicity on the
outcomes of civil proceedings); Donna De La Cruz, Judge Rejects Delay in Diallo Case; 3 Officers
Cited Fear of Publicity, THE RECORD (N.J.), Mar. 3, 1999, at A7 (refusing to postpone the grand
jury proceedings, the judge sought instead to interview the jurors to inquire into any possible influ-
ence created by media publicity); Patty Machelor, Pizza Hut Slaying Trial Moved Outside County,
TUCSON CITIZEN (Ariz.), May 20, 2000, at 1A (citing the effects of "extensive media coverage" as
the reason for allowing a change of venue).
55. But see Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that these interests are not
necessarily mutually exclusive).
56. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector
Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 561 (1995).
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III. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
It is important to examine the subset of privacy that this article ad-
dresses: informational privacy.5 7  As one scholar articulated, such pri-
vacy "is the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others., 58 Another scholar reasoned that such privacy
is control over knowledge about oneself But it is not simply control
over the quantity of information abroad; there are modulations in the
quality of the knowledge as well. We may not mind that a person
knows a general fact about us, and yet feel our privacy invaded if he
knows the details.5 9
Judge Posner has spoken of an interest he calls "the face we present to
the world., 60  Distinguishing certain privacy interests from the desire to
57. Five distinct privacy interests are generally recognized by scholars: (1) informational pri-
vacy, through which access to personal information is limited; (2) spatial privacy, through which
access to certain places, such as the home, is limited; (3) personal privacy, through which access to
the person, including the physical body and its image, is limited; (4) decisional privacy, through
which interference with personal decisions, including abortion and contraception, is limited; and (5)
relational privacy, through which interference with intimate relationships, including the family, is
limited. See generally Radhika Rao, The Origins and Growth of U.S. Privacy Law, in FOURTH AN-
NUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: PROTECTING YOUR CLIENT IN A SECURITY-CONSCIOUS WORLD
18 (Practising Law Institute, 2003) (showing presentation slides on topics in privacy law); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 532-33 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW]
(discussing types of privacy interests); SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 8, at 1 ("Informational
privacy is often contrasted with 'decisional privacy,' which concerns the freedom to make decisions
about one's body and family. . . . [I]nformational privacy increasingly incorporates elements of
decisional privacy as the use of data both expands and limits individual autonomy.").
58. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 8, at 28, (quoting ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREE-
DOM (1967)).
59. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968), quoted in SOLOVE & ROTENBERG,
supra note 8, at 31; see also ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE
SOCIETY 3 (1988) ("Privacy denotes a degree of inaccessibility of persons, their mental states, and of
information about them to the senses and surveillance devices of others."); Ruth Gavison, Privacy
and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) ("Our interest in privacy ... is related to our
concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to which we are known to others, the extent to
which others have physical access to us, and the extent to which we are the subject of others' atten-
tion."). See generally Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000).
60. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 57, at 531.
2004] PRIVACY, PLAINTIFFS, AND PSEUDONYMS
control one's image so that it can be marketed and sold, Judge Posner
wrote that
[we] "sell" our constructed public self in the figurative sense of using it
to make advantageous transactions in employment and marriage mar-
kets and, more generally, in the market for human relationships
whether of a personal or of a commercial character.61
A person seeking to bring an action anonymously is seeking a degree
of informational privacy, in that he is seeking to control both the quantity
and quality of knowledge about himself that is known to others. The
constitutional basis of a right to informational privacy must be assessed
so that it can be measured against the societal call for disclosure of the
person's identity.
A. Constitutional Basis for Privacy Rights
The United States Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy.
62
However, the idea that a right to privacy exists in the Constitution has
been developed in a series of cases over the past fifty years that turn on
the concept of "substantive due process." The seminal case is Griswold
v. Connecticut,63 in which the Supreme Court held that a Connecticut law
criminalizing contraceptives and counseling about contraceptives to mar-
61. Id.at532.
62. A number of state constitutions, however, directly provide for the protection of privacy.
See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not
be infringed."); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § I ("All people are by nature free
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy."); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from govemmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein.");
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest."); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall have
the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable
searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping de-
vices or other means."); id. § 12 ("Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all inju-
ries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation."); LA. CONST. art.
I, § 5 ("Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy."); MONT. CONST. art. II, §
10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."); S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated .... ); WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law.").
63. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ried couples was unconstitutional because it infringed upon the "zone of
privacy" created by the "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth amendments. 64 The Court reasoned that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees
create zones of privacy., 65 The Connecticut law, the Court held, had a
"destructive impact" upon the relationship of marriage, a relationship
that fell "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental con-
stitutional guarantees.,
66
Several other cases followed, each expanding on the notion of pri-
vacy that has come to be called "decisional privacy."67  The Supreme
Court soon tackled the matter of informational privacy, however, in
Whalen v. Roe 68 and in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.69 In
Whalen, the Supreme Court for the first time explicitly recognized that
"[t]he cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact
involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual
64. Id. at 484-85. Generally speaking, the First Amendment protects privacy of thought,
speech, and political association; the Fourth Amendment protects "reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy" in one's person, house, papers, and effects; and the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right
to prevent conception or terminate an unwanted pregnancy, the right to marry, rear children, and
reside with one's family, and may also protect the right to withhold medical information and the
right to refuse life-saving treatment. Rao, supra note 57, at 21.
65. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 485.
67. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding Texas criminal abortion statute un-
constitutional); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (concluding that Massachusetts statute
prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons is unconstitutional). An earlier case,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, concluded that a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried people was unconstitutional. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). "Decisional pri-
vacy" has been construed by the Supreme Court, in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
protection of one's autonomy to decide upon "matters ... involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy . "
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Thus, "[alt the heart of liberty
is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State." Id. The Court's recognition of decisional privacy in Casey
was recently affirmed in Lawrence v. Texas. 539 U.S. 558, 572-76 (2003).
68. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). In Whalen, the Court considered a New York state statute that col-
lected information related to prescriptions issued for "the most dangerous of the legitimate drugs,"
the so-called "Schedule II" drugs. Id. at 592-93. Pursuant to the statute, the New York State De-
partment of Health collected a form each time a Schedule II drug was prescribed. Id. at 593. The
form "identifie[d] the prescribing physician; the dispensing pharmacy; the drug and dosage; and the
name, address, and age of the patient." Id. The data was kept on tape, but tapes were kept in a
locked cabinet, and when the tapes were run on a computer, it was run off-line so that "no terminal
outside of the computer room [could] read or record any information." Id. at 593-94. An action was
brought by a group of patients who regularly received prescriptions for Schedule II drugs and by two
physicians' associations, contending that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected "zone of
privacy." Id. at 595-98.
69. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the in-
terest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.' 7°
The Court affirmed this notion of informational privacy in Nixon when it
concluded that President Nixon had a constitutional privacy interest in
records of his private communications with his family but not in records
involving his official duties.7'
The Supreme Court has done "little to develop the right of informa-
tional privacy" since Whalen and Nixon.72 As one court observed, the
right "has been infrequently examined; as a result, its contours remain
less than clear." 73 Because "the constitutional right to informational pri-
vacy has yet to develop a distinctive identity, courts.., often draw from
other types of privacy law.",74 According to one court, the constitutional
right to informational privacy "closely resembles-and may be identical
to--the interest protected by the common law prohibition against unrea-
sonable publicity given to one's private life.",75 Another court looked to
the "reasonable expectations" of privacy (or confidentiality) test to de-
termine whether information is entitled to protection under the constitu-
tional right to information privacy.76 Still other courts have refused to
accept the constitutional right to information privacy, 77 and one has ex-
pressed doubts as to whether it exists at all.78
Absent any clear direction from the Supreme Court, and given the
confusion apparent in the lower courts, an assessment of the status of the
right of information privacy is difficult. Nevertheless, recognition of the
concept is appropriate when a court is evaluating a plaintiffs request for
70. 429 U.S. at 598-600. In Whalen, the patients and physicians also argued that "even if
unwarranted disclosures do not actually occur, the knowledge that the information is readily avail-
able in a computerized file creates a genuine concern that causes some persons to decline needed
medication." Id. at 602-03. Similarly, persons who are denied leave to proceed pseudonymously
may decline to bring suit at all, an aspect of decisional privacy, or more particularly, the infringe-
ment thereof
71. 433 U.S. at 455-65.
72. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 8, at 189.
73. Davis v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
74. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 8, at 189.
75. Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 376 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989), cited in SOLOVE & RO-
TENBERG, supra note 8, at 189.
76. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 112 (3d Cir.
1987), cited in SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 8, at 189.
77. See Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the Supreme Court
has construed the right to informational privacy only when a fundamental liberty interest is impli-
cated), cited in SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 8, at 189; J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090
(6th Cir. 1981) (holding that there is no constitutional right to the nondisclosure of private informa-
tion), cited in SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 8, at 189.
78. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), cited in SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 8, at 189.
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pseudonymity, given the realities of modem litigation and the invasive
nature of modem technology.
B. Statutory Developments in Privacy Law
The federal government has recognized the threat that technology
represents to privacy and has responded with a series of initiatives de-
signed to protect privacy interests. These initiatives are all premised on
the same awareness that is the foundation of this article: technological
advances are challenging privacy in ways never before seen, such that
prompt and effective responses are necessary before a valuable right is
irretrievably lost.
Starting in about 1973, in response to growing fears about the ability
of computers to store and search personal information, the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare undertook an extensive
review of data processing in the United States.79 Among its recommen-
dations, the Department "proposed that a Code of Fair Information Prac-
tices be established."8 The Code of Fair Information Practices consists
of basic information privacy principles that allocate rights and responsi-
bilities in the collection and use of personal information:
* There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose
very existence is secret.
* There must be a way for an individual to find out what information
about him is recorded and how it is used.
* There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about
him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available
for other purposes without his consent.
* There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record
of identifiable information about him.
* Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating re-
cords of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the
data for its intended use and must take reasonable precautions to
prevent misuse of the data.8'
79. SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 8, at 22.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 23 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SECRETARY'S ADVI-
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As Daniel Solove observed, the Code of Fair Information Practices has
"played a significant role in framing privacy laws in the United States., 82
Both the constitutional basis for informational privacy law and the
recent formation of a multitude of statutory initiatives to protect privacy
support the idea that privacy interests should be given greater recognition
and consideration in the context of evaluating plaintiffs' requests for
pseudonymity.
82. Id. at 23 (citing Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Pri-
vacy (What Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001)). Beginning in the 1970s,
Congress passed a number of laws protecting privacy in various sectors of the information economy.
Id. (citing PRIVACY LAW SOURCEBOOK (Marc Rotenberg ed., 2001)). See, e.g., Consumer Credit
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2003))
(providing citizens with rights regarding the use and disclosure of their personal information by
credit reporting agencies); Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 3 (1974) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2003)) (providing individuals with a number of rights concerning their
personal information maintained in government record systems, including the right to see one's
records and to ensure that information in them is accurate); Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380 (1974) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1232g (2003))
(protecting the privacy of school records); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
630 (1978) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2003)) (requiring a subpoena or search
warrant for law enforcement officials to obtain financial records), amended by Intelligence Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-177 (2003); Privacy Protection Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 96-440, § 101 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2003)) (restricting the
government's ability to search and seize the work product of the press and the media); Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2 (1984) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
551 (2003)) (mandating privacy protection for records maintained by cable companies); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986), 103-414 (1994) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2709 (2003)) (updating Federal Wiretap Law to respond
to the new developments in technology); Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-503, §§ 2-6(a), 7, 8 (1988) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2003)) (regu-
lating automated investigations conducted by government agencies comparing computer files); Em-
ployee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347 (1988) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2003)) (governing the use of polygraphs by private sector employers); Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2710-2711 (2003)) (protecting the privacy of videotape rental information); Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 3(a) (1991) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227
(2003)) (providing certain remedies from repeat telephone calls by telemarketers); Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-
2725 (2003)) (restricting the states from disclosing or selling personal information in their motor
vehicle records); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2003)) (giving the De-
partment of Health and Human Services the authority to promulgate regulations governing the pri-
vacy of medical records); Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277
(1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2003)) (restricting the use of information
gathered from children under age 13 by Internet websites); Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-102 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2003)) (requiring privacy
notices and providing opt-out rights when financial institutes seek to disclose personal data to other
companies).
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IV. HISTORICAL BASIS OF JUDICIAL OPENNESS
Many courts base their reluctance to permit plaintiffs pseudony-
mously to bring their actions on the long-standing tradition of "open tri-
als." One of the bedrocks of American jurisprudence is the openness of
judicial proceedings. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
"historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively
open."' 83 This openness can be traced to the earliest judicial systems of
colonial America. 84 For example, a Seventeenth Century agreement pro-
vided
[t]hat in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or crimi-
nal, any person or persons, inhabitants of said Province may freely
come into, and attend the said courts, and hear and be present, at all or
any such tryals as shall be there had or passed, that justice may not be
done in a comer nor in any covert manner ....85
This tradition continues to the present day, and although numerous
federal courts have recognized a public right of access to proceedings
and documents in civil cases, they have differed on the scope of the right.
In Publicker Industries v. Cohen, for example, the Third Circuit held that
the public has the right of access to a preliminary injunction hearing.86
And in In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, the Eighth Circuit
allowed public access to a contempt hearing.87 Similarly, in Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, the Sixth Circuit held that the First
Amendment limits judicial discretion to seal documents in civil litiga-
88tion. In Newman v. Graddick, the Eleventh Circuit found a First
Amendment right of access to proceedings and a common law right of
access to documents in a lawsuit about prison overcrowding.89
Notwithstanding the professed sanctity and long-standing tradition of
open trials, the Supreme Court has nevertheless implicitly recognized the
83. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,580 n.17 (1980).
84. Id. at 567.
85. 1677 Concessions and Agreement of West New Jersey, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959).
86. 733 F.2d 1059, 1074 (3d Cir. 1984).
87. 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1984).
88. 710F.2d 1165, 1177(6thCir. 1983).
89. 696 F.2d 796, 802-03 (11 th Cir. 1983). See also Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F.
Supp. 647, 650 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that the right to attend civil trials is grounded in both First
Amendment and common law).
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propriety of permitting certain plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously. 90
The first pseudonymous case before the Court, Poe v. Ullman, involved
plaintiffs who sought a declaratory judgment invalidating Connecticut
statutes that prohibited the use of contraceptives. 91 The Supreme Court
permitted the case to be heard with the plaintiffs using the pseudonym
"Poe" without discussion of the matter, stating only that
"[p]laintiffs... sue under fictitious names. The Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut approved this procedure in the special circumstances of
the cases." 92 Twelve years later, in Roe v. Wade, the plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were un-
constitutional on their face. The Supreme Court, in referring to Roe,
stated merely "[t]he name is a pseudonym.,
93
V. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF PSEUDONYMITY
Despite the tacit approval of pseudonymous plaintiffs by the Su-
preme Court, most state and federal courts are reluctant to permit plain-
tiffs to proceed pseudonymously. They adhere to the tradition of open
trials, without examining the modem influences suggesting that this tra-
dition is no longer viable in a technological age. Typically these courts
state only "[i]n rare instances will we allow parties to proceed under false
names because the public has a right to know who is using the courts."
94
They generally premise denials of leave to proceed anonymously on one
or more of several grounds:
(1) the absence of any express provision in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (and the equivalent state rules) permitting such a
procedure;
(2) the notion that public scrutiny protects against judicial abuse;
90. State courts have permitted plaintiffs to bring pseudonymous actions as early as 1941. See,
e.g., Doe v. Doe, 30 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Fam. Ct. 1941) (permitting, without discussion, a mother seeking
child support on behalf of her minor children to bring her action under a pseudonym).
91. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
92. Id.at498n.l.
93. 410 U.S. 113, 120 n.4 (1973); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 184 n.6 (1973) (noting
that appellants alleged that Doe was a pseudonym).
94. Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 668 n.4 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997)). See also Roe v. New York, 49 F.R.D. 279, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (ruling, prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton,
that "if a complaint does not identify any plaintiff in the title or otherwise, then its filing is ineffec-
tive to commence an action.").
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(3) the belief in increased respect and confidence in the judicial sys-
tem when trials are open;
(4) the idea that open trials induce witnesses to come forward; and
(5) the theory that openness in the system provides a therapeutic ef-
fect on the community.
95
A closer examination of ideas and concerns reveals that judicial reluc-
tance to permit plaintiff pseudonymity is not warranted in many cases,
and can often defeat the very values that courts seek to protect.
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a)
Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules") nor the advi-
sory notes specifically address the issue of pseudonymous filing. In-
stead, Rule 10(a) requires simply that the title of the action in the com-
plaint include "the names of all the parties." 96 Rule 10(a) provides in
pertinent part:
Caption; Names of parties. Every pleading shall contain a caption set-
ting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number,
and a designation as in Rule 7(a).97 In the complaint the title of the ac-
tion shall include the names of all the parties, but in other pleadings it is
sufficient to state the name of the first party on each side with an ap-
propriate indication of other parties. 98
One court has interpreted this to mean that there is "no legal right in par-
ties either to be allowed anonymity or to avoid it, and that trial courts
correspondingly have no unreviewable license either to grant or deny
anonymity on general principles, but power only to grant or deny it on
the basis of an 'informed' discretion." 99
95. See generally Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants
Be Permitted to Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 13-17 (1985) (discussing
the tension between pseudonymous litigation and the right to access).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
97. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 provides instructions regarding necessary pleadings and
delineates various forms of motions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
99. James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1993). See also Doe v. City of Chicago, 360
F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The presumption that parties' identities are public information, and
the possible prejudice to the opposing party from concealment, can be rebutted by showing that the
harm to the plaintiff... exceeds the likely harm from concealment.").
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Other courts have taken a harder line, holding that the Rules provide
a general ban on filing suits under fictitious names to "protect the pub-
lic's legitimate interest in knowing which disputes involving which par-
ties are before the federal courts that are supported with tax payments
and that exist ultimately to serve the American public." '00 Taking a
more rule-based, formalistic approach, the Tenth Circuit has held that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiffs who had not
sought permission to proceed anonymously, "as a case ha[d] not been
commenced with respect to them."'10' Similarly, in Estate ofRodriquez v.
Drummond Co.,10 2 the Northern District of Alabama held that it did not
have jurisdiction over the pseudonymous plaintiffs because they used
pseudonyms without first obtaining the permission of the court, and that
the procedural defect could not be cured by an order granting permission
to proceed anonymously nunc pro tunc; the defect was jurisdictional and
could not be cured after the fact.1
0 3
Most courts, however, even those that consider captions with pseu-
donymous plaintiffs a failure to comply with Rule 10(a), have recognized
that there are circumstances in which plaintiff pseudonymity is appropri-
ate. 1 4  In Doe v. U. S. Department of Justice,10 5 for example, a judge
brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act to discover what in-
formation and documents the Drug Enforcement Administration pos-
sessed relating to him, and sought to do so pseudonymously in order to
avoid the attendant bad publicity. 10 6 The federal court held that his ac-
tion would not be considered to have commenced unless and until it was
filed in what it considered to be full compliance with Rule 10(a). 107 But
even so, the court recognized that in some instances a plaintiff may pro-
100. Doe v. Ind. Black Expo, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 137, 139 (S.D. Ind. 1996). Other courts have
recognized a similar concern of allowing public access to information associated with litigation.
"Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly prohibit use of pseudonyms for
purposes of litigation, courts have recognized that 'lawsuits are public events and the public has a
legitimate interest in knowing the facts involved in them. Among those facts is the identity of the
parties."' Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 887 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (quoting Doe v.
Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont. 1974)). See also Roe v. City of New York, 49 F.R.D.
279, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("The privilege of using fictitious names in actions should be granted only
in the rare case where the nature of the issue litigated and the interest of the parties demand it and no
harm can be done to the public interest." (quoting Buxton v. Ullman, 156 A.2d 508, 515 (Conn.
1959))).
101. Nat'l Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 1989).
102. 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
103. Id. at 1255-57.
104. See, e.g., id. at 1256-57 (citing Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323-24 (11 th Cir. 1992)) (list-
ing circumstances in which plaintiffs were allowed to proceed pseudonymously).
105. 93 F.R.D. 483 (D. Colo. 1982).




ceed anonymously.10 8 The court refused to issue a protective order in the
case, however, finding that the public interest in the proceeding-a judge
seeking to learn what the DEA "had on him"--outweighed the privacy
interests of the plaintiff judge.'0 9
Many state rules of civil procedure mirror Federal Rule 10.110 Not
surprisingly, therefore, many state courts have opted to follow the factor
test used by the federal courts in determining which plaintiffs should be
permitted to bring their actions pseudonymously."' One state, Virginia,
has gone so far as to recently codify these factors in its code of civil pro-
cedure. 112 The inefficiency and ineffectiveness inherent in the federal
courts' methods for evaluating plaintiff pseudonymity requests is only
magnified at the state level," 3 because state courts are left with conflict-
ing and inconsistent federal court rulings for guidance in making their
own decisions regarding plaintiff pseudonymity.
Denying pseudonymity based on the language of Rule 10(a) seems
excessively formalistic. The Rule calls for "the names of all the par-
ties" ' 1 4 but it does not state that the names must be the true and correct
legal names of all parties. If that is what the Rule intended, the drafters
could have said so specifically. Thus, precluding anonymity based solely
on Rule 10(a) does not appear to be justified.
B. Promoting Confidence in the Integrity of the Judicial System
Some courts justify their reluctance to permit plaintiffs to proceed
pseudonymously on the theory that open trials lead to increased confi-
dence in the judicial system."' The right of access to the courts is gener-
ally founded on First Amendment concerns that mandate that certaingovernment proceedings be open to the public "to protect the free discus-
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 10(a); ARK. R. Civ. P. 10(a); OHIO R. CIV. P. 10(a); S.C. R.
Civ. P. 10(a).
111. See, e.g., King v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 850 A.2d 428, 432-35 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2004) (reviewing the holdings in several federal plaintiff pseudonym cases in the context of defen-
dant wishing to proceed anonymously).
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-15.1 (2003).
113. See discussion infra at Part VIIA.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
115. See, e.g., Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that, with respect to
plaintiffs' anonymity, there is a keen First Amendment interest in ensuring that what occurs in the
courtroom is public property); Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 160-61 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that
the public has a legitimate interest in knowing all the facts and events surrounding court proceed-
ings).
[Vol. 53
PRIVACY, PLAINTIFFS, AND PSEUDONYMS
sion of governmental affairs."'1 16 Thus, the intent is to promote trust in
the integrity and honesty of the judicial system. More than a century
ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes expressed this sentiment when he
stated:
It is desirable that the trial of [civil] causes should take place under the
public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another
are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those
who administer justice should always act under the sense of public re-
sponsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself
with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is per-
formed. '17
More recently, the Second Circuit continued this theme, reasoning that
openness has the salutary effect of protecting against judicial abuse and
promoting increased respect and confidence in the judicial system.
The presumption of access is based on the need for federal courts, al-
though independent-indeed, particularly because they are independ-
ent-to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have
confidence in the administration of justice. Federal courts exercise
powers under Article III that impact upon virtually all citizens, but
judges, once nominated and confirmed, serve for life unless impeached
through a process that is politically and practically inconvenient to in-
voke. Although courts have a number of internal checks, such as ap-
pellate review by multi-judge tribunals, professional and public moni-
toring is an essential feature of democratic control. Monitoring both
provides judges with critical views of their work and deters arbitrary
judicial behavior. Without monitoring, moreover, the public could have
no confidence in the conscientiousness, reasonableness, or honesty of
judicial proceedings. Such monitoring is not possible without access to
testimony and documents that are used in the performance of Article III
functions. "8
116. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (citation omitted); see
also Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 25, at 1201 ("Understood broadly, the First
Amendment protects openness in information flow. [Thus,] the Court and lower courts have held
that the First Amendment provides certain rights of access to at least some government proceedings
and records.").
117. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
118. United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Doe v. City of Chi-
cago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e express our concern about the plaintiff's litigating
under a pseudonym. Judicial proceedings are supposed to be open ... in order to enable the pro-
ceedings to be monitored by the public.").
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Those observers who subscribe to the belief that "[o]penness ... en-
hances both the basic fairness ... and the appearance of fairness so es-
sential to public confidence in the system"' 9 tend to focus on whether
the verdict was just, i.e. the appropriateness of a decision regarding the
underlying merits of the claim, not fairness in terms of equal access to
the courts and the ramifications of disclosing personal information. 20 In
order to uphold the values underlying the "openness doctrine," however,
courts must focus not only on reaching a just result regarding the merits
of a claim, but on fairness regarding the ramifications to those seeking to
vindicate their rights and the value to society of having these claims
brought forth.
It is the rare case today in which the public cannot realize the full
benefits of an open trial without knowing the plaintiffs name, so long as
the pertinent characteristics of the plaintiff are freely available to all ob-
servers. When this is the case, the public is able to view the workings of
the judicial system and scrutinize the results that are reached. The
Fourth Circuit spoke to this point in James v. Jacobson.1 21 In that case,
the plaintiffs were a husband and wife who sued the doctor whom the
couple had hired to perform artificial insemination of Mrs. James with
Mr. James's sperm. As a result of the procedure Mrs. James became
pregnant and had two children. Several years later the couple discovered
that Jacobson, and not Mr. James, was the biological father of the two
children. The distraught couple sought to commence a civil action using
pseudonyms against Jacobson, concerned about the effect that the suit
would have on their children if the children learned that Mr. James was
not their biological father.122 Reversing the trial court's denial of leave
to proceed pseudonymously, the Fourth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs
disavowed any request to be protected at trial against the risk of their
indirect identification, and that
anonymity in this case would be limited to the pseudonym that they
use, not to who they are in every other respect. That is, their profes-
sion, where they come from, what they do, what they stand for; and all
119. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
120. Furthermore, openness was originally touted in a time when someone interested in an action
had to expend time and effort going to a courthouse to watch the proceedings or manually search
through courthouse files to find information about a particular case. Today, the Interet and elec-
tronic legal databases have changed all of that. One can simply type the word "AIDS" into an "all-
cases" database and retrieve hundreds of cases involving parties with AIDS and intimate details
about those parties.
121. 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993).
122. Id. at235.
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of the other portions of cross examination would be there. The
only thing that would be absent would be their true name to protect the
identity of their children.
.... Demeanor is demeanor, however the witness is identified, and it
would seem to make no difference to a jury in assessing whether such
things as the particular occupation or place of residence of a witness
might bear upon his credibility, whether the witness bore the name
John Smith or Henry Williams.
123
Thus, as the Fourth Circuit so succinctly explained, the public loses noth-
ing when a plaintiff is allowed to proceed pseudonymously but all the
other facts and circumstances of the case remain in view. 124 As a result,
public confidence in the judicial system need not suffer by the use of
plaintiff pseudonymity.
Conversely, mandatory open judicial proceedings may not be in the
best interests of society. When the plaintiffs identity is disclosed to the
court and to the defendant only, little is lost from society's perspective,
because the allegations, defenses, and evidence-albeit redacted or oth-
erwise altered to protect the plaintiffs identity-are still in full view. By
contrast, some potential plaintiffs may forfeit their opportunity to seek
justice, out of fear of having their private information become known.
Other would-be plaintiffs may choose not to bring suits because they fear
the consequences of being known as litigious. 25 This results in costs to
the public as well as to the plaintiffs-courtrooms with wide open doors
but with empty seats and no litigants, and lost opportunities for the crea-
tion of invaluable precedent.
Even the purported confidence-building benefits of open trials are
not borne out by supporting data. Although it has been argued that pub-
lic scrutiny protects against judicial abuse, even in the current atmos-
123. Id. at 241,242.
124. See also Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981). In Stegall, the Fifth Circuit stated:
Party anonymity does not obstruct the public's view of the issues joined or the court's
performance in resolving them. The assurance of fairness preserved by public presence
at a trial is not lost when one party's cause is pursued under a fictitious name. These cru-
cial interests served by open trials . . . are not inevitably compromised by allowing a
party to proceed anonymously.
Id. at 185.
125. The Tenth Circuit has held that it is not racial discrimination to refuse to hire a black appli-
cant on the basis of fear that he is litigious and might embarrass the employer by filing racial dis-
crimination lawsuits against businesses in the local community. See Drake v. Colo. State Univ.,
Nos. 97-1076, 97-1077, 1998 WL 614474, at *5 (10th Cir. Sept. 8, 1998).
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phere that promotes open trials, judicial abuse is nonetheless present in
our system. 26 Furthermore, access to documents pertaining to a judge's
potential conflict of interest is not easy to obtain. 27 Additionally, there
is undoubtedly a countervailing decrease in confidence in the judicial
system among plaintiffs forced to choose to abandon their meritorious
claims for fear of being required to disclose private matters.
When plaintiffs choose not to pursue their claims, rather than suffer
the embarrassment of the public accessing their private facts or unseemly
encounters, 128 society as a whole loses an opportunity to participate in the
judicial system and to be a part of actions that often create valuable
precedent. Thus, openness needs to be weighed against plaintiffs' le-
gitimate interests in privacy. The public can scrutinize the judicial proc-
ess without knowing the plaintiffs name, as long as the pertinent charac-
teristics of the plaintiff are available to all. 129 When this is the case, the
goals behind the desire for open trials are met, even though the plaintiffs
name is kept from the public, because the public still is able to view the
workings of the judicial system and evaluate the results that are
reached. 
30
To the extent that open trials do enhance confidence in the judicial
system, this goal is much more likely to be achieved in the criminal arena
rather than in the civil arena. Indeed, much of the tradition of judicial
126. For example, in California alone, twenty judges were removed from the bench for discipli-
nary reasons from 1973 to 2003, thirty-five judges were censured from 1970 to 2003, and twenty-
nine were issued public admonishments between 1995 and 2003. STATE OF CALIFORNIA COMMIS-
SION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, PUBLIC DISCIPLNE/DISMISSALS-1960 TO PRESENT,
http://cjp.ca.gov/pubdisc.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
127. Liptak, supra note 21. "According to a new report by the Government Accounting Office,
[litigants questioning whether a judge has a conflict of interest] must submit a request in writing;
swear under oath that they will not use the information unlawfully or for a commercial purpose; pay
a copying fee; and wait an average of 90 days before the documents are mailed to them." Id.
128. In a recent example, a woman working for Middle Tennessee State University withdrew a
complaint of sexual harassment against the president of the university one week after filing it, upon
being advised by the Board of Regents that the media would report on the event. REPORTERS COM-
MITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, RESTRAINING ORDER CUTS OFF ACCESS TO SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT COMPLAINT, http://www.rcfp.org/news/2003/ll04janedo.html (Nov. 4, 2003). Even
though the complaint had been withdrawn, however, the Board of Regents continued to investigate
the complaint, and the media sought to obtain a copy of the complaint. Id. The university obtained a
restraining order barring the release of the complaint pending a hearing to decide if it should be
released under the Tennessee Public Records Act. Id. The state attorney general later issued a brief
stating that the complaint was a public record and therefore subject to release. MTSU Sexual Har-
assment Complaint May be Released (News Channel 5 broadcast, Nov. 14, 2003), at
http://www.newschanne15.com/content/news/2784.asp.
129. Stegall, 653 F.2dat 185.
130. See id. (stating that the "crucial interests" addressed by open trials "are not inevitably com-
promised by allowing a party to proceed anonymously").
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openness has developed in the criminal sphere.1 31 The Supreme Court
has noted that the right to a public trial is "a safeguard against any at-
tempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowl-
edge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the
forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of ju-
dicial power."'132 As one writer expressed it, criminal trials are "secular
rituals through which people hope that the mystery of evil will be ex-
plained."'133  As the Supreme Court expressed, "[c]ivilized societies
withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante the enforcement of
criminal laws, but they cannot erase from people's consciousness the
fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done-or even the urge for
retribution."'
' 34
The trials of the now-convicted Washington-area snipers are perti-
nent examples. John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo were ar-
rested and charged with homicides in multiple jurisdictions after they
terrorized the Washington, D.C., area for several weeks in the fall of
2002. 13  After their arrests, there seemed to be little doubt about their
guilt: the murder weapon was found in their car, their DNA was report-
edly present at several of the crime scenes, and the shootings stopped
after they were apprehended. 36 Furthermore, the two defendants' respec-
tive defense strategies seemed to confirm their guilt: each planned to
blame the crimes on the other. 137 Even so, public interest in the trial was
tremendous, but not as "searches for truth, at least not in the factual sense
,0138 tetil emdt aeo
of who committed the crimes. Instead, the trials seemed to take on a
131. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 593 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("Open trials play a fundamental role in furthering the efforts of our judicial system to
assure the criminal defendant a fair and accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence.").
132. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979) (emphasis added) (quoting In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)). The Supreme Court has noted further that "it would be difficult
to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and importance to the people than the
manner in which criminal trials are conducted." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575 (emphasis
added).
133. Paul Butler, We Want the Trial as Much as the Verdict, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at B 1.
134. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571.
135. See, e.g., Francis X. Clines & Christopher Drew, With 2 Held, Police Tie Rifle in Car to
Sniper Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002, at Al; Rob Granatstein, Suspects Caught Napping; 2
Men Arrested Early This Morning Sleeping at Maryland Rest Stop, TORONTO SUN, Oct. 24, 2002, at
B2; Who Will Punish Them? Jurisdictions Jockey for Right to Prosecute Sniper Suspects, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 28, 2002, at A5.
136. Butler, supra note 133. See also Stephen Braun, Virginia Judge: Malvo Confession Can Be
Used at Sniper Trial, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 2003, at 18 ("The decision by [the judge] strengthens a
prosecution case already braced by a wealth of physical evidence."); Adam Liptak, At Sniper Trial, a
Chilling Tape Is Heard by Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at Al.




significance independent of the eventual conviction and punishment of
the defendants by helping the community cope with evil.1 39
Few civil trials fit this bill, and the impetus for open judicial pro-
ceedings in the civil context is thus far less compelling. Instead, civil
trials are more typically battles between two or more parties about a mat-
ter of purely private interest-very often, which party will pay what
amount to the other party. To the extent that there is any public interest
in the proceedings, it is often voyeuristic, or for entertainment value-
hardly the kind of ideals judicial openness was designed to further. 40 In
the event that there is any legitimate public interest in a civil battle, per-
haps because it illuminates an area of public concern or a changing
ethos, 141 plaintiff pseudonymity would not hamper the trial, because the
public and the press can easily deal with a "John Doe" or "Jane Doe,"
particularly when the pertinent characteristics of the plaintiffs are re-
vealed.
Applying the rationale from criminal cases to civil proceedings also
fails to recognize that civil litigation and criminal proceedings implicate
different concerns of different weight. 142  In the words of one federal
court, there is an important distinction between the "civil context, where
the importance of confrontation [of one's accuser] is not as great" and
the "criminal context, where the more carefully guarded rights of the de-
fendant are involved.' 43 In criminal proceedings, all of society is one of
the litigants, as the prosecution seeks to enforce the interests of the
community. Thus, all of society has an interest in the resolution of un-
certainty regarding a defendant's guilt. 144  Civil litigation, in contrast,
generally involves purely private interests where the litigants sort out the
allocation of disputed resources. 45 Finally, the respective outcomes of
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Gest v. Minelli, No. 03/118332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Oct. 21, 2003) (David Gest
sued soon-to-be ex-wife Liza Minelli for $10 million alleging assault and battery; Minelli counter-
claimed alleging, inter alia, breach of contract), http://www.thesmokinggun.com/
archive/lizaabuse 1.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
141. See, e.g., Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386-87 n.15 (1979) (citing Dred Scott
v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, Brown v. Board of Education, and University of California v. Bakke
as civil cases that may be of substantial public concern equaling, and perhaps surpassing, that which
exists in criminal cases).
142. But see id. at 387 ("[I]n some civil cases the public interest in access, and the salutary effect
of publicity, may be as strong as, or stronger than, in most criminal cases.").
143. United States v. Bateman, 805 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (D.N.H. 1992).
144. See Butler, supra note 133 (describing the public's interest in criminal adjudications).
145. But see Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding, in a suit con-
cerning penal administration in Alabama, that the public's constitutional right of access extends to
civil cases relating to the incarceration of prisoners, and stating that "[i]f it is beneficial to have
public scrutiny of criminal proceedings that may result in conviction and punishment, then it is also
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the proceedings demand a different level of solicitude for judicial open-
ness. In the criminal context, a public proceeding seems to make the
punishment-which indeed may include death-more respectable.146 In
civil litigation, no deprivation of life or liberty is implicated, so there is
less need to protect the integrity of the process with public scrutiny.
Thus, justifications for open trials that have evolved from the crimi-
nal arena are less than useful when weighing the appropriateness of
pseudonymity in the civil context. Moreover, many of the purported
"benefits" of open trials either do not preclude plaintiff pseudonymity, or
are not borne out by experience or common sense.
C. Causing Other Witnesses to Come Forward
Some courts have based their opposition to pseudonymous plaintiffs
on the notion that open proceedings might cause other members of the
community to come forward as additional witnesses. 47 This idea pro-
vides scant justification for denying leave to proceed pseudonymously in
the modem era. At least in civil litigation, the notion seems rather ar-
chaic, even quaint, in this era of wide-ranging discovery. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A) imposes on all parties the duty to provide,
at the outset of the litigation, "the name and, if known, the address and
telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable informa-
tion that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses,
unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the informa-
tion." 41 With the net cast so wide from the very start of the litigation, it
seems unlikely that any potential witness would have escaped it, only to
appear voluntarily and spontaneously upon reading press accounts of the
case. Indeed, even scholars who advocate for open judicial civil pro-
ceedings acknowledge that
[i]n these days of wide ranging discovery, when litigants are entitled to
demand of each other the identity and location of all persons having
helpful to allow public access to civil proceedings that modify the earlier trials by freeing prisoners
before their sentences are completed or parole has been granted").
146. Id.
147. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, Justice Brennan suggested that unknown wit-
nesses might step forward if the trial, with all the parties' names known, was publicized. 448 U.S.
555, 596-97 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses
unknown to the parties."). See also San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Superior
Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (reasoning that "open proceedings discourage
perjury and might encourage other witnesses to come forward which in turn leads to more accurate
fact-finding").
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A).
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knowledge of any matter relevant to the subject of the pending
action .... it is rather unlikely that there will be unknown witnesses
whom open judicial proceedings will induce to come forward. The his-
torical view to the contrary consequently has lost much of its validity,
even when names are not hidden.
149
Modem litigation has changed considerably during the past few dec-
ades. 150 Adopted in 1938 and expanded in ensuing decades, 5 1 the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery were broadened in
1983 so that the scope of discovery widened even further.152 Moreover,
the 1983 amendments imposed restrictions directed chiefly at the use of,
rather than the acquisition of, the information discovered, notwithstand-
ing concerns about the costs that greatly expanded discovery has in-
curred. 153 At the same time that the Rules were evolving to allow wider
inquiry, new causes of action that require inquiry into private behavior
were being created, including, most notably, sexual harassment law-
suits. 1
54
Yet while the claims against the defendant are merely "allegations"
and a plaintiff can be sanctioned for bringing a frivolous claim, often it is
the plaintiffs reputation that ultimately suffers irreversible harm. A
plaintiff who alleges sexual harassment can be sure that her sexual his-
tory, interpersonal relationships, mental health, and medical history will
149. Steinman, supra note 95, at 19 n.88.
150. See generally 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2001 (2d ed. 1994).
151. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, discovery in federal
courts was "extremely limited." Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 698 (1998). The only dis-
covery available to parties involved in litigation "was provided for in two federal statutes dealing
with depositions." Id. The 1946 amendments to Rule 26, however, have since eliminated the judi-
cially crafted admissibility requirements that had arisen over the preceding years. Id. at 736. Rule
26 was amended again in 1983 to reign in overly broad discovery by adding provisions allowing the
court to limit discovery otherwise permitted by the rules if the discovery was unreasonably cumula-
tive or duplicative or if the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighed its likely bene-
fit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
152. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 150, § 2001.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 88-352, § 703, (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463 (2004) (prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination based on sex); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (Supp. 2002) (same); N.Y. EX-
ECUTIVE LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 2004) (proscribing various forms of unlawful discriminatory
practices, including sexual discrimination); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73
(1986) (holding that "a claim of 'hostile environment' sex discrimination ... is actionable under
Title VII" and affirming the district court's decision to admit testimony regarding the "respondent's
sexually provocative speech and dress").
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be dissected. 155 Moreover, wide-ranging discovery means that witnesses
may be called from far and wide and documents sought from all manner
of sources, however tangentially related to the case. A plaintiff might
choose not to bring a meritorious action, fearing both the onslaught of
scrutiny into her private affairs coupled with the stigma of being labeled
litigious. 156
Any analysis of requests for pseudonymity that is not mindful of
these new realities is myopic and should be corrected.
VI. THE FIVE FACTORS
Despite judicial reluctance to endorse plaintiff pseudonymity, several
courts have recognized that the ideals behind judicial openness must give
way when justice warrants and society benefits. For example, the Sixth
Circuit, which has emphasized the importance of open civil proceed-
ings, 157 noted that "[t]he right of access is not absolute, however, despite
... justifications for the open courtroom. Courts have carved out several
distinct but limited common law exceptions to the strong presumption in
favor of openness .... [One of] these interests include[s] certain privacy
rights of participants .... ,,158
In the absence of any guidance from the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 159 and with only implicit recognition of the practice of permitting
plaintiff anonymity by the Supreme Court, 160 federal courts have devel-
oped a factor-based approach that attempts to weigh the parties' privacy
155. See, e.g., Tamar Stieber, The "Nuts and Sluts" Strategy, GLAMOUR, Aug. 1996, at 138
(describing the writer's harrowing experience, after filing a sex discrimination suit against her em-
ployer, in which her sex life and medical records came under scrutiny and she became the subject of
a ferocious campaign of intimidation).
156. Recently, a friend went on a second employment interview with a large national bank. As
she handed the manager her resume, she explained to him that her name had changed since the last
time she had interviewed with the company (which was about six weeks earlier) because she had
married in the interim. Hoping to ensure that there would be no confusion within the bank as her
two resumes--one with her maiden name and one with her married name-circulated through the
firm, she politely started to explain the change from her former name to her current name. The
manager interrupted her and said, "Quite frankly, I don't care what your former name was as long as
it wasn't 'Plaintiff."'
157. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983)
("Throughout our history, the open courtroom has been a fundamental feature of the American judi-
cial system.").
158. Id. at 1179.
159. See supra Part V.A.
160. See supra Part IV.
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interests against the perceived desirability of judicial openness. The ma-
jority of courts examine five basic factors in order to determine which
plaintiffs to permit to proceed pseudonymously:
(1) whether the plaintiff would risk suffering injury if publicly
identified;
(2) whether the plaintiff is challenging governmental activity;
(3) whether the plaintiff would be compelled to admit her inten-
tion to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal
prosecution;
(4) whether the plaintiff would be required to disclose informa-
tion of the utmost intimacy; and
(5) whether the party defending against a suit brought under a
pseudonym would be prejudiced.161
It is the thesis of this Article that these factors bear re-evaluation in light
of the changing nature of modem litigation and technology. But first, it
is helpful to review their genesis and modem application.
A. The First Three Factors
The first three factors were developed by the Fifth Circuit in 1979, in
Southern Methodist University Ass 'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne
& Jaffe.162 That case involved several female lawyers who sought to
bring anonymous actions against two Dallas law firms for allegedly en-
gaging in illegal sexual discrimination in the hiring of summer clerks and
associates, in violation of Title VII.1 63 The Fifth Circuit first noted that
there were no prior decisions that recognized or even discussed "the right
of Title VII plaintiffs to proceed anonymously," and that "[n]either the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor Title VII itself' provided for
anonymous plaintiffs.164 Nevertheless, the court noted, "[u]nder certain
special circumstances ... courts have allowed plaintiffs to use fictitious
161. See, e.g., EW v. New York Blood Ctr., 213 F.R.D. 108, 111 (E.D.N.Y 2003); see also
James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1046-47
(N.D. Iowa 1999); Doe v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 467-68 (E.D. Pa.
1997). Other factors are sometimes cited as well, including the extent to which the identity of the
litigant has been kept confidential; whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues pre-
sented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigants' identities;
and whether the interests of children are at stake. See Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-47.
162. 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979).
163. Id. at 708-09 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2004)).
164. Id. at 712.
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names."'' 65 The court observed that "'where the issues involved are mat-
ters of a sensitive and highly personal nature,' such as birth control, abor-
tion, homosexuality or the welfare rights of illegitimate children or aban-
doned families, the normal practice of disclosing the parties' identities
yields 'to a policy of protecting privacy in a very private matter."",
166
The Fifth Circuit in Wynne & Jaffe articulated what would become
the first three of the five factors used by courts to determine the merits of
a plaintiffs request to bring a pseudonymous action. In order to be enti-
tled to bring their claims, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs in
those actions in which plaintiffs' pseudonymity would be granted: (1)
would have to divulge personal information of the utmost intimacy; (2)
would have to be challenging the constitutional, statutory, or regulatory
validity of governmental activity; or (3) would have to admit that they
had either violated or intended to violate state laws or government regu-
lations, or that they wished to engage in prohibited conduct. 167 In con-
trast, the plaintiffs in Wynne & Jaffe ran none of the risks associated with
such filings. To the contrary, they publicly accused the defendant law
firms of serious violations of federal law, and "[b]asic fairness dictates
that those among the defendants' accusers who wish to participate in this
suit as individual party plaintiffs must do so under their real names."'
168
The court therefore affirmed the trial court's order mandating disclosure
of the plaintiffs' identities by proper pleadings.
169
165. Id.
166. Id. at 712-13 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (birth control); Doe v. FAA, 412 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1969) (ho-
mosexuality); Doe v. Carleson, 356 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (welfare).
167. 599 F.2d at 713.
168. Id. The suit had been brought by the Southern Methodist University Association of Women
Law Students (the "Association") as well as four individual female lawyers. Id. at 708-09. The
defendants had also sought the Association's current membership list as well as the identities of
women who plaintiff "claimed were hesitant to join 'or labor for the Association in the public eye'
and who were afraid 'that, if they associated with the Association, they will be singled out for dis-
crimination by Defendants and other law firms."' Id. at 713-14 (quoting the trial court's order).
The trial court had granted the defendant law firm's motion to compel production of this information
but placed restrictions on to whom it could be divulged. Id. at 714. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the trial court had struck "a sensible balance" between the defendant law firm's "need to defend this
lawsuit and the Association's desire to avoid the purportedly adverse consequences of revealing
information with respect to its membership." Id.
169. Id at 713.
2004]
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
B. The Fourth Factor
The factors first articulated in Wynne & Jaffe were expanded upon
two years later by the Fifth Circuit in Doe v. Stegall, where the court
added a fourth factor, relating to plaintiffs' possible physical injury.1 70 In
Stegall, a mother brought an action on behalf of her two minor children
challenging the constitutionality of prayer and Bible reading exercises in
Mississippi public schools.17 1 The mother sought to shield her identity
from the public for fear of hostile public reaction to her lawsuit. The
court first observed that "it would be a mistake to distill a rigid, three-
step test for the propriety of party anonymity from the fact-sensitive
holding in [Wynne & Jaffe]. 172 Nevertheless, the court stated, the three
factors identified in that case "deserve considerable weight in the balance
pitting privacy concerns against the presumption of openness of judicial
proceedings."
'173
In Stegall, the plaintiffs were threatened with "extensive harass-
ment-and perhaps even violent reprisals-if their identities are dis-
closed to a ... community hostile to the viewpoint reflected in plaintiffs'
complaint."'174 Standing alone, according to the court, the threat of hos-
tile public reaction to a lawsuit "will only with great rarity warrant public
anonymity," but in Stegall the plaintiffs had already been threatened with
violence.1 75 Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that pseudonymity was war-
ranted.
Similar concerns and a heavy reliance on Stegall motivated the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Georgia to permit plaintiff pseu-
donymity in Doe v. Barrow County.176 In that case, the plaintiff sued the
county, challenging a Ten Commandments display at the county court-
house as a violation of the separation of church and state. 7 7 The Barrow
County court observed that
courts in this circuit have considered numerous factors when determin-
ing whether a plaintiff should be permitted to proceed anonymously.
170. 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981).
171. Id. at 181.
172. Id. at 185.
173. Id. at 186.
174. Id.
175. Id. The plaintiffs offered several documentary exhibits to bolster their assertions that they
might be subject to retaliatory harassment or violence if their identities were revealed, including
local newspaper reports of public reaction to the lawsuit that betrayed visceral anti-Semitism. Id. at
183 n.6.
176. 219 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
177. Id. at 190.
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For example, the Stegall court catalogued previous cases where plain-
tiffs had been allowed to prosecute under a fictitious name and found
that most involved suits challenging government activity, suits where a
plaintiff would have to disclose information "of the utmost intimacy,"
and suits where plaintiffs were compelled to admit their intention to
engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution.
178
The court first acknowledged the plaintiffs privacy concerns, noting
that "it hears cases against the government, sometimes involving very
private concerns, on a regular basis" but that "'religion is perhaps the
quintessentially private matter.' ' 179 Although the defendants argued that
the plaintiff would "not need to reveal his religious beliefs" over the
course of bringing an action, the court reasoned that he would need to
show that he had been injured by the courthouse display in order to have
standing, and that although he might not need to directly state his reli-
gious affiliation, or lack thereof, he would need to explain why he was
injured by the presentation.180
The court then noted that the plaintiff had presented evidence of
threats and intimidation directed to him and his family. 18  Moreover, the
court said,
[a]t least one member of the community has attempted to intimidate
several of the judges of this court ... by leaving angry and inappropri-
ate voice messages. Although the court will not be affected by attempts
at intimidation, they are relevant to show the tenor being displayed by
some members of the public.
82
Thus, the court concluded that "this is one of those rare cases in which
the plaintiff should be permitted to proceed anonymously."'
' 83
178. Id. at 193 (citing Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185).
179. Id. (quoting Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 193-94.
182. Id. In attempting to assure the public's right to express thoughts on the sensitive issues
involved in the case without fear of threats or intimidation, the Barrow County court stated that it
would "not tolerate, nor condone through inaction, any threatening or intimidating acts against any-
one involved in this litigation" and referred the matter to the United States Attorney pursuant to a
federal statute "which makes it a federal crime to, amongst other things, knowingly use intimidation
or threats with the intent to influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official
proceeding." Id. at 194 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (2003)).
183. Id. The court also ordered the plaintiff to "make himself known to the court and counsel for
the defense" and ruled that "[any proceedings necessary to determine standing, or other issues de-
fendants wish to pursue with the plaintiff, will be conducted in a closed setting." It considered any
possible inconvenience to the defendant, by allowing the plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously, to be
"relatively low." Id. In particular, the court reasoned:
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C. The Fifth Factor
The fifth factor, whether the plaintiffs pseudonymity will prejudice
the defendant in defending against the suit, has been viewed as having
two facets: (1) whether plaintiff pseudonymity will prejudice the defen-
dant's case by jeopardizing access to information necessary to the de-
fense;184 and (2) whether plaintiff pseudonymity is fair to the defendant,
who is "required to defend himself publicly while the plaintiff could
make her accusations from behind a cloak of anonymity."' 8 5
Some courts emphasize any prejudice that the plaintiffs pseudonym-
ity may visit on the defendant. In Doe v. Indiana Black Expo, Inc., for
example, the plaintiff sought "an order that would prohibit the defen-
dants from using his real name in defending themselves publicly against
his public accusations" of discrimination.' 8 6  The court found that even
though the defendants knew the plaintiffs identity-he was a former
employee-"the anonymity plaintiff seeks would significantly hamper
This is not a case that will be determined by plaintiffs credibility or recitation of facts.
Rather, as long as plaintiff has standing to sue, this case will depend on the resolution of
a legal question: Does the display of the Ten Commandments in the county courthouse
violate the Constitution? The relevant facts, including who placed the display, what is
included in the display, how long it has been presented, etc., will likely come from wit-
nesses other than the plaintiff. The legal issues, while possibly the subject of expert tes-
timony, will be determined by the arguments of counsel. At the end of the day, plaintiff
plays a relatively minor role in this litigation, and the constitutionality of the Ten Com-
mandments display will be determined in proceedings open and accessible to all. In light
of the response these issues have generated from some in the community, the court feels
it appropriate to allow plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym.
Id.
In Nebraska, a federal magistrate permitted a plaintiff to pseudonymously sue a city about a Ten
Commandments monument. See Todd Cooper, ACLU Requests Restraint on Press, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 21, 2004, at Al. Interestingly, however, a federal district court judge in
Nebraska stated he would not consider potential threats to the plaintiff when it came to a request to
order that his name be withheld from publication by the press, or alternatively be hidden through the
use of a pseudonym. Id. The judge noted that to order the use of a pseudonym by the press would
be a prior restraint and a violation of the First Amendment. Id. A commentator on the case noted
that the Supreme Court has never upheld an order preventing the press from publishing. Id.
184. Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1048 (N.D. Iowa 1999) ("Doe's use of a
pseudonym ... seems unlikely to provide any bar.., to the defendants' access to information neces-
sary to defend the suit .... ").
185. Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citations omitted); see also Hartz, 52
F. Supp. 2d at 1048 (finding "considerable appeal to the defendants' argument that they should not
be held up to public ridicule while their accuser remains anonymous, when it is their accuser who
has focused public attention on the circumstances she finds embarrassing") (citing Shakur, 164
F.R.D. at 361).
186. 923 F. Supp. 137, 141 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
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their ability to defend themselves from adverse publicity and other col-
lateral, but often inevitable, effects of civil litigation."
187
Most courts, however, emphasize fairness considerations. For ex-
ample, in Doe v. Shakur the plaintiff alleged that the rap singer Tupac
Shakur had sexually assaulted her. 188 Before filing her complaint, the
plaintiff had obtained an order ex parte from the trial judge, sealing the
complaint and permitting her to file a substitute complaint using a pseu-
donym.' 89 Shakur failed to file a timely answer, and a default was entered
against him. 90 Shakur then moved to vacate the entry of default, and in
so doing used the plaintiff's real name, arguing that the trial court's order
merely sealed the complaint and did not provide that the entire proceed-
ing was to be conducted under seal.' 91 Agreeing with that assessment of
the trial court's order, the district court then evaluated the fairness to
Shakur of permitting the plaintiff to proceed anonymously.
First, plaintiff has chosen to bring this lawsuit. She has made seri-
ous charges and has put her credibility in issue. Fairness requires that
she be prepared to stand behind her charges publicly.
Third, Shakur has been publicly accused. If plaintiff were permit-
ted to prosecute this case anonymously, Shakur would be placed at a
serious disadvantage, for he would be required to defend himself pub-
licly while plaintiff could make her accusations from behind a cloak of
anonymity. 192
The court rejected the plaintiffs claims that she would be "'publicly hu-
miliated and embarrassed"' if her name was revealed, finding that such
claims "are not sufficient grounds for allowing a plaintiff in a civil suit to
proceed anonymously .... Death threats, in contrast, would provide
a legitimate basis for allowing her to proceed anonymously, but the
187. Id.; see also Doe v. Wolowitz, No. 01-73907, 2002 WL 1310614, at *5 (E.D. Mich. May
28, 2002) (stating that "Defendant complains that he would be prejudiced defending against a suit
brought under a pseudonym because he would be unable to issue subpoenas using Plaintiff's
name.").
188. 164 F.R.D. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Archive, New York State Department of
Correctional Services Photograph of Shakur, The Smoking Gun, at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/
archive/newmugs2.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
189. 164 F.R.D. at 360.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 361 (citations omitted).
193. Id. at 362.
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plaintiff had not "provided any details, nor has she explained how or why
the use of her real name in court papers would lead to harm, since those
who presumably would have any animosity toward her already know her
true identity."' 94 Finally, the court conceded that "[i]t may be, as plain-
tiff suggests, that victims of sexual assault will be deterred from seeking
relief through civil suits if they are not permitted to proceed under a
pseudonym."' 95 But the court was untroubled by this prospect, deeming
it an "unfortunate result" but reasoning that "[flor the reasons discussed
above . . . plaintiff and others like her must seek vindication of their
rights publicly.'
196
Some courts evenly weigh the prejudice and fairness aspects of the
fifth factor when determining whether to allow a plaintiff to proceed
pseudonymously. In Doe v. Hartz, for example, the District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa considered whether the plaintiffs use of a
pseudonym would prejudice defense of a suit involving a female parish-
ioner who alleged that her parish priest had touched her inappropri-
ately. 197 The court reasoned that the defendants had
not articulated how defending against a suit brought under a pseudo-
nym would prejudice their defense of the suit. Doe's use of a pseudo-
nym in this litigation seems unlikely to provide any bar, for example, to
the defendants' access to information necessary to defend the suit: The
defendants are already intimately familiar not only with the incidents
alleged but with the actual identity of the plaintiff' 98
The Hartz court then weighed the other fairness aspect of the fifth factor,
and found that "there is considerable appeal to the defendants' argument
that they should not be held up to public ridicule while their accuser re-
mains anonymous, when it is their accuser who has focused public atten-
tion on the circumstances she finds embarrassing."' 99 The court then
determined that it was "appropriate" to "weigh the speculative nature of
the potential harm to Doe from revealing her identity against the very
real embarrassment her accusations have already caused the defen-
194. Id. (citing Doe v. Hallock, 119 F.R.D. 640, 644 (S.D. Miss. 1987)). Apparently the court
was unfamiliar with the phenomenon of the crazed fan who seeks to vindicate any slur on his idol,
and apparently the court hadn't considered the possibility that not all such fans were already aware
of the plaintiff's name and address.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1035 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
198. Id. at 1047-48 (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 1048 (citing Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
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dants.,, 200 After considering all the factors, the Hartz court determined
that "prosecution of this litigation under a pseudonym is not appropriate,
because Doe does not have a substantial privacy right that outweighs the
customary and constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in
judicial proceedings. 2 °1
The issue of fairness to the defendant sometimes brings into play a
subsidiary consideration: the nature of the plaintiffs allegations. To
some courts, pseudonymity is inappropriate in a "case involving direct
and personal attacks upon the reputation and integrity of the defendant
and in which personal credibility will play a large role in the issues in the
case." 202 According to one court:
[M]any of the cases in which courts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed
under fictitious names have involved claims that did not include direct
and personal attacks upon the reputation and integrity of the defen-
dants, and where personal credibility played little if any role in the is-
sues in the case. In challenges to statutes and regulations affecting, for
example, abortion or birth control, or the plaintiffs' challenge to school
prayer practices in Doe v. Stegall, the anonymous plaintiffs were
merely a few of many potential plaintiffs who could have challenged
the constitutionality of the defendants' statutes or practices. There
were no significant issues in which the plaintiffs' personal credibility
played an important role. The constitutional claims asserted raised no
personal challenge to the defendants' integrity or reputations.20 3
D. Other Factors
Utilization by various courts of the five-factor balancing test has led
to inconsistent results. One district court, for example, noted that the fact
that the suit was against a governmental entity boded in favor of permit-
ting the plaintiff to proceed anonymously, 2°4 while another district court
stated that because the plaintiff was suing the government, this "cut
against her position., 20 5 Other courts have reached conflicting decisions
20
when similar fact patterns were present. 206 Courts have not specified
200. Id.
201. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
202. Doe v. Wolowitz, No. 01-73907, 2002 WL 1310614, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 28, 2002).
203. Doe v. Ind. Black Expo, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
204. EW v. N.Y. Blood Ctr., 213 F.R.D. 108, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
205. Doe v. City of New York, 201 F.R.D. 100, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
206. Compare Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 176 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (allowing pseudonymous
litigation for plaintiff suing various law enforcement personnel for sexual harassment after finding in
favor of plaintiff under a balancing test) with Doe v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 1:98CV01095, 1999 WL
1939248, at *1, *6 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 15, 1999) (mem.) (denying, after conducting a balancing test,
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which, if any, of the factors should be given more weight than others,
and often courts go through the motions of examining all of the factors
when really only one factor is dispositive. °7 The inadequate nature of
these five factors to provide satisfactory guidance to courts faced with
plaintiff anonymity decisions has forced several courts to create and ex-
amine additional criteria. These supplementary factors include a review
of whether the interests of children are involved, 8 whether the identity
of the litigants has already been exposed 20 9 and whether there is an atypi-
cally weak public interest in knowing the litigants' identities.10
Furthermore, courts have not determined whether any of the factors
should be treated as a threshold matter. A review of the application of
several of these factors in noteworthy cases exemplifies the shortcomings
in the current procedures used by courts when deciding which plaintiffs
should be permitted to proceed pseudonymously. It also highlights the
need for revision of the balancing test. Presently, each of these factors is
applied in an ad hoc manner that provides no consistency to plaintiffs
looking for guidance on how best to pursue their interest in remaining
anonymous. Moreover, these criteria do not recognize the two aforemen-
tioned monumental changes that have occurred in the legal landscape in
the past few years: (1) dramatic changes in both the procedural and sub-
stantive nature of civil litigation; and (2) the astounding growth of the
Internet and information technology, including electronic filing.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
I propose that courts recognize a right to privacy and acknowledge
that right when considering plaintiffs' requests for pseudonymity. I fur-
ther recommend that courts revise the factors currently used to make de-
cisions regarding such requests, and I suggest new criteria to aid with the
plaintiff's pseudonymity motion where plaintiff claimed that she was sexually assaulted and raped
by her supervisor).
207. For example, in Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island, the court treated as one
of the primary factors (if not the dispositive factor) weighing in favor the plaintiff's pseudonymity
his status as a transsexual, which the court viewed as a matter of an "exceedingly personal" nature.
794 F. Supp. 72, 73 (D.R.1. 1992).
208. See Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 887 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (granting
child's request for pseudonymity to avoid risk of harassment and permanency of lawsuit's record).
209. See Doe v. Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., 162 F.R.D. 418, 422 (D. Mass. 1995) (denying plain-
tiffs motion to proceed pseudonymously, in part, "because plaintiffs true identity was revealed in
administrative proceedings[,] [rendering] the request for anonymity... effectively moot").
210. See Evans, 202 F.R.D. at 175 (stating, as one of several factors to be considered in allowing
litigation to proceed pseudonymously, "whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues
presented ... there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigant's identities.") (cita-
tion omitted).
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evaluation process. I also propose that plaintiffs' motions to proceed
pseudonymously be handled by a specialized judge or magistrate who
can develop an expertise in ruling on these types of motions.
A. A New Procedure for Evaluating Plaintiff Pseudonymity Requests
Aside from failure by courts to recognize the erosion of personal pri-
vacy, another significant problem facing would-be pseudonymous plain-
tiffs is a lack of procedural guidelines and consistency.21' Courts and the
legislature have not developed a uniform procedure to which plaintiffs
should conform when seeking to pursue a matter pseudonymously.12
The current lack of procedural uniformity diminishes public confidence
in the judicial system. Lawyers are left guessing as to how to properly
advise their clients, and court decisions appear inconsistent and unpre-
dictable. Some courts, recognizing the need to protect plaintiff privacy
but lacking an effective means to do so, have resorted to extraordinary
measures--"super sealing documents. 213
211. See, e.g., Unwitting Victim v. C.S., 273 Kan. 937, 945, 47 P.3d 392, 399 (2002) (indicating
the lack of judicial or statutory guidance in determining when a plaintiff could proceed pseudony-
mously).
212. Almost twenty years ago, Joan Steinman wrote a comprehensive review of pseudonymous
parties, urging the adoption of better procedural guidelines regarding anonymous plaintiffs. See
generally Steinman, supra note 95. More than ten years after that, Professor Carol Rice proposed
changes to the federal and state rules to ease the problems associated with pseudonymous parties.
See generally Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time For Federal Civil Procedure To Recognize
John Doe Parties, 57 U. Pirr. L. REv. 883 (1996). To date these calls largely have gone unan-
swered.
213. In December 2002, Connecticut courts were found to have engaged in a process of secretly
sealing cases. This process sometimes entailed concealing the very existence of the case, including
its docket number. See generally Paul von Zielbauer, Connecticut Judges Plan to Drop Secrecy
Option, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at BI (reporting that the practice of"supersealing court records"
had existed since 1980); Thomas J. Scheffey, State Divorce Courts Quick to Cloak Cases: UConn
President Philip Austin Alias Is Now "Level 1-10", CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 2, 2002, at I (discussing
secrecy options in divorce cases) [hereinafter Divorce Courts Cloak Cases]. Courts gave sealed
cases a classification of Level One, Two, or Three depending on the level of secrecy deemed appro-
priate by the judge. A Level One classification required the highest level of secrecy. See generally
Lynne Tuohy, No Docket, No Names; Cases Move in Secrecy, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 5, 2003, at
A1 (statement of Melissa Farely, executive director of external affairs for the Judicial Branch, saying
"Level 1 means we can't even say the case exists"); Divorce Courts Cloak Cases, supra (quoting F.
Herbert Gruendel, chief administrative judge of the family division, saying "[a] level two sealing
means the name and docket number are public but the contents are sealed" and a "'level three' seal-
ing is generally public, with individual motions and documents sealed").
Although judges were required to explain their reasons for sealing a case, these justifications of-
ten were withheld from the public along with the contents of the case. Divorce Courts Cloak Cases,
supra. Under the pre-amended Rule 11-20 of the Connecticut Rules for the Superior Court: Proce-
dure in Civil Matters, regardless of whether a party has filed a motion, the judge may order that the
public be excluded or documents be sealed if he finds that "such order is necessary to preserve an
interest which is determined to override the public's interest in attending such proceeding or viewing
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One state court in New York, lacking concrete guidance from the
federal courts regarding how to handle a request by a plaintiff to proceed
pseudonymously, examined the underlying merits and likelihood of suc-
cess of a plaintiffs claim to determine whether to permit the plaintiff to
proceed anonymously,2 14 while another state court presumed that the
plaintiffs allegations were true for purposes of deciding her motion to
proceed under a pseudonym.2t 5 More than thirty years ago, the Southern
District of New York suggested three different procedures for plaintiffs
to follow when seeking to proceed anonymously, yet none of these pro-
cedures has formally been adopted.21 6 Furthermore, some courts that
have denied plaintiffs' attempts to proceed anonymously have permitted
such materials." Id. (quoting Connecticut Rules for the Superior Court: Procedure in Civil Matters §
11-20 (portions regarding sealing of documents in § Rule 11-20 amended and transferred to Con-
necticut Rules for Superior Court: Procedure in Civil Matters § I I-20A (adopted May 14, 2003))).
Thus, there appears to be explicit authorization for the practice of sealing court records. But the
above provision must be read in light of Rule 11-20(a), which creates a "presumption that courtroom
proceedings shall be open to the public." I CONN. PRAc., PRAC. BK. ANN. SUPER. CT. Civ. RULES
§ 11-20(a) (2004); See also Divorce Courts Cloak Cases, supra (stating that "[b]y the very language
of [Rule 11-20], the basic assumption is that adult civil matters are public .. "). Moreover, most of
the justifications for sealing the court records were never disclosed. See Divorce Courts Cloak
Cases, supra. Such a privilege was often accorded to the more notable figures in Connecticut. See
Dave Altimari & Eric Rich, Elite Enjoy "Secret File " Lawsuits, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 9, 2003,
at Al (reporting that "interviews and court records reveal that the influential and connected are well
represented among the beneficiaries [of the sealing of court records]"). Thus, the practice of "super-
sealing" cases resulted in a loss of the fundamental requirements of public accountability and judi-
cial integrity. Lynne Tuohy, Testimony Heard on Secrecy, Judges' Rules Panel Proposing Changes,
HARTFORD COURANT, May 1, 2003, at BI (statement of Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut State
Attorney General, saying, "[tihe public, which pays for the court system that the parties have in-
voked to resolve their dispute, has a right to know whether these cases are decided fairly and consis-
tently, knowing all the facts in each case").
Recognizing the impropriety of its practice, the Rules Committee of the Superior Court swiftly
ended the practice by amending the rules in May 2003. Thomas Scheffey, Secret Files Abolished by
Judges: Financial Affidavit Protections Also Adopted After Lengthy Debate, CONN. L. TRIB., May
19, 2003, at 1.
The amended rule allows for the sealing of an entire court file only "upon a finding that there is
not available a more narrowly tailored method of protecting the overriding interest, such as redac-
tion, sealing a portion of the file or authorizing the use of pseudonyms." I CONN. PRAC., PRAC. BK.
ANN. SUPER. CT. Civ. RULES § 11 -20A(f)(2) (2004). In addition, the newly adopted Rule II -20A
also requires that the public take part in and have access to the court's findings regarding the sealing
of court files. § II -20(e)-(f)(1) (2004). In June 2004, the Second Circuit ruled in Hartford Courant
Co. v. Pellegrino, a case challenging the sealing of dockets in Connecticut, that "the press and public
possess a qualified First Amendment right of access to docket sheets." 380 F.3d 83, 86 (2nd Cir.
2004).
214. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 744 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
215. Doe v. City ofNew York, 201 F.R.D. 100, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
216. See Roe v. New York, 49 F.R.D. 279, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (proposing that plaintiffs should
(i) file a complaint using their real names and then request a protective or confidentiality order to
shield the plaintiffs identity; (ii) use a pseudonym in the complaint and reveal their true identity to
the court in an attached affidavit; or (iii) use a pseudonym in the complaint but sign the complaint
using their real names).
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plaintiffs to amend their complaints to include their true names,217 while
others have simply dismissed the action outright.2t8 Some judges within
the same court have conflicting opinions regarding the appealability of
requests to proceed anonymously, with some stating that an appeal of the
denial of such a motion is premature because it is not based on the merits
of the claim. Still other judges note that to deny such an appeal is to ir-
reparably prevent a plaintiff from being put back in its former position.219
Protection:-of personal privacy in the information age requires that
plaintiff pseudonymity become an integral aspect of civil procedure. By
using pseudonyms, courts can achieve protection for plaintiffs while
maintaining public access to the issues involved in the proceedings. I
suggest that a specialized judge or magistrate be responsible in the first
instance for determining whether a particular plaintiff should be permit-
ted to proceed pseudonymously. Designating a judicial officer who can
focus her attention on the often intricate and intimate investigative work
necessary to properly review a plaintiff'S pseudonymity request will help
standardize and streamline the process of evaluating such requests. In
this way, a degree of uniformity can be attained in what heretofore has
been an ad hoc process.
Hearing plaintiffs' motions to proceed pseudonymously is an ideal
use of a federal magistrate's authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636,220 and
217. See, e.g., Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 163 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (recognizing that, although
the court had authority to dismiss a complaint sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b) for noncompliance with proper pleading procedures, such a result was deemed to be "drastic").
Thus, the court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. Id. at 164.
218. See, e.g., M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803-04 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming the lower
court's decision to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
10(a) because it did not include the names of all parties).
219. In Doe v. Union Pacific Railroad, a woman sought to anonymously file a claim against her
physician for sexual assault. 914 S.W.2d 312 (Ark. 1996). The trial court denied the plaintiffs
request to proceed pseudonymously, and the plaintiff appealed that decision. Id at 313. The Su-
preme Court of Arkansas held that the plaintiffs appeal was premature because it was not based on
the merits of the claim. Id. at 315. Three members of the Arkansas Supreme Court dissented, argu-
ing that "this is one of the comparatively rare instances, foreseen by some of our earlier opinions, in
which an order must be regarded as appealable because otherwise the order would divest a substan-
tial right in such a way as to put it beyond the power of the court to put the party in its former condi-
tion." Id. at 315 (citing Omni Farms, Inc. v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 607 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Ark.
1980)). The dissent emphasized that the plaintiff had furnished her name to the defendant, was
available for discovery, and would appear at trial to testify. Id. The dissent argued that the court
should "determine whether a right of utmost privacy would be lost by going to trial rather than
merely dismissing the matter for lack of a final order." Id. at 316.
220. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary--(A) a judge may designate a
[magistrate judge] to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, ex-
cept a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment,
to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evi-
dence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss
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would be appropriate for state magistrates as well. Congress created the
judicial position of the magistrate with the Federal Magistrates Act of
1968.221 The primary purpose of the federal magistrate judge is to im-
prove the efficiency of the federal judicial system and reduce the increas-
ing workload of the Article III district court judges.222 In particular,
magistrate judges are intended to handle the many "pretrial and prelimi-
nary matters" that arise in a case, thus allowing the district court judges
to preside over actual trial-related matters.223 Although the states do not
have a uniform magistrate structure, it is not uncommon for state courts
to assign certain judges to handle such pretrial or preliminary matters on
a regular basis.224 Thus, the duty of hearing motions to proceed pseudo-
nymously may be delegated to state judicial officers who handle the pre-
liminary matters of a case, similar to the federal magistrate judge.
The power of the magistrate judge to handle "pretrial matters" is
statutorily authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and implemented by
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss
an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subpara-
graph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous
or contrary to law.
§ 636(b)(l)(A) (2000).
221. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (2000)). Due
to the increasing importance of the magistrate, Congress changed the title of this position to magis-
trate judge. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5112, 5117
(1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2000)).
222. See S. REP. No. 96-74, at 3 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1469, 1471-72 (ex-
pressing the purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act as "facilitat[ing] a rational division of labor
among judicial officers in the district court, as the magistrate would relieve the judge from person-
ally hearing each and every pretrial motion or proceeding in the preparation of a case for trial."); S.
REP. No. 92-1065, at 3 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3350, 3351 (stating that magistrates
"render valuable assistance to the judges of the district courts, thereby freeing the time of those
judges for the actual trial of cases."). The Supreme Court has also affirmed the intentions of Con-
gress in establishing the position of the federal magistrate. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501
U.S. 923, 934 (1991); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 142 (1991); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 268 (1976); Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 463 (1974).
223. H.R. REP. No. 94-1609, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6167 (stating
that the "use of a magistrate [under the Federal Magistrates Act] will further the congressional intent
that the magistrate assist the district judge in a variety of pretrial and preliminary matters thereby
facilitating the ultimate and final exercise of the adjudicatory function at the trial of the case" and
that "[w]ithout the assistance furnished by magistrates in hearing matters of this kind, . . . the [trial]
judges of the district courts would have to devote a substantial portion of their available time to
various procedural steps rather than to the trial itself").
224. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 22 ("The Legislature may provide for the appointment by
trial courts of record of officers such as commissioners to perform subordinate judicial duties.")
(emphasis added); NEW YORK SUPREME COURT-CIVIL BRANCH, COUNTY CLERK LITIGATION
FUNCTIONS, COMMENCING ACTIONS CLAIMED TO BE CONFIDENTIAL (stating that applications for
proceeding anonymously should be submitted to the ex parte office in which an ex parte justice will
consider the application), at http://www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh/litigationfunctions.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 16, 2004).
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Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22 ' Although no defini-
tion of the term "pretrial" exists in either the statute or the rule, the legis-
lative history of § 636 and the purpose of the magistrate judge in easing
the workload of the district court judges suggests a liberal interpreta-
tion.226 Thus, the range of pretrial matters decided by magistrate judges
is broad, including "discovery motions, motions to amend pleadings, mo-
tions to intervene, motions to extend discovery deadlines, and motions to
disqualify counsel., 227  Aside from pretrial matters, district courts may
also assign "additional duties [to the magistrate judges that] are not in-
consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. 228 As
evidenced by the legislative history and the enabling statute itself, the
magistrate judge has become an indispensable figure in the federal judi-
ciary. The determination of whether a plaintiff should be allowed to pro-
ceed pseudonymously fits squarely within the duties of the magistrate
judge. 29
225. 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3068 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER, PRETRIAL]. See generally 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) (2000); FED. R. CIv. P. 72.
226. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1609, at 9 (1976), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6169 ("Un-
der [§ 636(b)(1)(A)] a judge, in his discretion, may assign any pretrial matter to be heard and deter-
mined by a magistrate ... [including] motions and matters which can arise in the preliminary proc-
essing of either a criminal or a civil case." (emphasis added)).
227. WRIGHT & MILLER, PRETRIAL, supra note 225, § 3068.1, notes 5-9 (collecting cases). It
should be noted that section 636(b)(1)(A) lists eight motions, often referred to as dispositive mo-
tions, which the magistrate judge is excepted from hearing and determining. These include motions
(1) for injunctive relief; (2) for judgment on the pleadings; (3) for summary judgment; (4) to dismiss
or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant; (5) to suppress evidence in a criminal
case; (6) to dismiss or permit maintenance of a class action; (7) to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted; and (8) to dismiss an action involuntarily.
§ 636(b)(1)(A). A magistrate judge may, however, upon request by a district court judge, issue
"findings of fact and recommendations for [a] disposition" with reference to any of the eight motions
enumerated above. § 636(b)(1)(B). This distinction is significant for purposes of determining the
standard of review accorded by the district judge in the event an objection is made to the magis-
trate's findings. WRIGHT & MILLER, PRETRIAL, supra note 225, § 3068.2. Pretrial matters decided
by the magistrate under section 636(b)(1)(A) are reconsidered only if "clearly erroneous or contrary
to law." § 636(b)(l)(A). Motions decided under section 636(b)(1)(B) are reconsidered by the dis-
trict court judge de novo. § 636(b)(1)(C).
228. § 636(b)(3). The main purpose of this "catchall" provision is to allow the district courts to
freely experiment with "the assignment of other duties to magistrate judges which may not necessar-
ily be included in the broad category of'pretrial matters."' H.R. REP. No. 94-1609, at 12 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6172.
229. Generally, seeking leave to sue pseudonymously occurs pretrial. See 67A C.J.S. Parties §
170 (2003). It thus falls under the class of pretrial matters that a magistrate judge may hear and
determine. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Cases may exist where the plaintiff seeks leave to amend the
pleadings for purposes of proceeding pseudonymously. See, e.g., Unwitting Victim v. C.S., 273
Kan. 937, 950, 47 P.3d 392, 402 (2002) (finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing
to allow the plaintiff to amend its petition to proceed pseudonymously after the case had been dis-
missed). Thus, depending upon the time of the filing, the magistrate may decide the matter under
section 636(b)(1)(A) as a "pretrial matter" or under section 636(b)(3) as an "additional dut[y]."
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
The specialized judge or magistrate would have numerous functions.
Primarily, she would make a thorough evaluation of the particular plain-
tiffs pseudonymity request. After doing so, the specialized judge or
magistrate would recommend to the court whether or not to permit the
plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously. Over time, specialized judges or
magistrates would develop an expertise and efficiency in dealing with
plaintiffs seeking to proceed anonymously, and they could continue their
involvement with the parties should problems develop throughout the
course of the litigation. This would increase judicial efficiency by free-
ing the courts from the often time-consuming efforts necessary to deter-
mine the veracity of the plaintiffs' claims regarding the need for ano-
nymity. Courts would be able to review the recommendations and make
a more fair determination of who should be permitted to proceed pseu-
donymously. Furthermore, specialized judges or magistrates can make
recommendations regarding the procedural intricacies of defendants
counterclaiming against pseudonymous plaintiffs and can recommend
that the court award sanctions against plaintiffs who bring frivolous mo-
tions to proceed anonymously. Although some might argue that it would
be appropriate for the court trying the merits of the action to be exposed
at the outset to plaintiffs who may be acting in bad faith, having a spe-
cialized judge or magistrate handle these cases in the first instance will
reduce the number and types of problems inherent with the current sys-
tem.
B. Revision of the Five Factors Currently Used to Determine Plaintiff
Pseudonymity in Light of Privacy Concerns
Given the changing landscape regarding personal privacy, it is nec-
essary to reexamine and revise the current factors used to evaluate who
may proceed pseudonymously. In order to make these criteria more per-
tinent and applicable to modem society, I propose both changes to the
existing factors and the addition of new factors. The following is a
summary of these proposals.
1. Whether the Plaintiff Would Risk Injury if Publicly Identified
Most courts that have evaluated this factor have focused on whether
the plaintiff would suffer physical harm if required to bring her action
publicly. But those courts that insist that only physical safety or retalia-
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tion can justify pseudonymity 230 are ignoring the well-established wis-
dom that "modem enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon
[an individual's] privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. 23 1
For example, some courts refuse to consider potential economic
harm as a reason for granting pseudonymity. 232  In Southern Methodist
University Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, discussed
above in Part VI.A, several female lawyers sought to sue two Dallas law
firms for sex discrimination but feared that, if their identities were re-
vealed, the legal community would retaliate by refusing to hire them.233
The Fifth Circuit denied their pseudonymity request, overlooking the
very real danger to the plaintiffs that bringing the lawsuit in Dallas would
do to their future employment options in the Dallas area. Undoubtedly,
when the plaintiffs' names hit the media, they risked permanent unem-
ployment in metropolitan Dallas or even beyond, as everyone would
know their names and that they were trouble. Today it would be a very
simple matter for a potential employer to go online and research appli-
cants, discovering all manner of information, including their participation
230. See, e.g., Doe v. N.C. Cent. Univ., No. 1:98CV01095, 1999 WL 1939248, at *2, *3
(M.D.N.C. Apr. 15, 1999) (mem.) (denying pseudonymity, despite plaintiff's allegations of sexual
assault and rape by a supervisor and consequent concerns about a negative reaction from her "'tradi-
tional Chinese family,"' and concluding that "concerns of embarrassment do not weigh as heavily as
in some other circumstances involving more serious risk of social stigma or disclosure of more inti-
mate personal information"); Doe v. Bell At. Bus. Sys. Serv., 162 F.R.D. 418, 422 (D. Mass. 1995)
(denying pseudonymity in a case involving alleged sexual harassment and discrimination, holding
that "[p]laintiff's fundamental concern seems to be embarrassment, which is not, in itself, grounds
for proceedings under a pseudonym").
231. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 196.
232. Other courts have held that mere embarrassment is not sufficient injury to warrant plaintiff
pseudonymity. In Doe v. Indiana Black Expo, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that while he was employed
by the defendant, Indiana Black Expo, he was the subject of unlawful harassment and was eventually
fired in violation of various federal and state statutes. 923 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D. Ind. 1992). In
particular, he claimed that the defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by terminating
his employment when he took time off to receive mental health treatment. Id. The plaintiff sought
to proceed anonymously against his employer, claiming that he had a history of substance abuse and
mental health hospitalization and that "[l]itigation of his claims on their merits [would] require de-
tailed consideration of his medical history and condition. [Consequently] his ... employment and
other business interests would be adversely affected if his medical history were known by those with
whom he ha[d] 'current business and personal interests."' Id. at 140-41. The Southern District of
Indiana denied the plaintiff's request, stating that "[tihe plaintiffs asserted needs for proceeding
under a fictitious name are understandable but are not sufficient to overcome the strong presumption
in favor of requiring parties to sue using their true names." Id. at 142. In support of its decision the
court reasoned that "[t]herc is no issue here of physical safety or retaliation. Plaintiffs concerns in
this case are centered upon his economic well-being and possible embarrassment or humiliation, but
courts have generally rejected attempts to proceed under fictitious names based solely on such con-
cerns." Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
233. 599 F.2d 707, 710-11 (5th Cir. 1979).
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234in a discrimination suit many years before. A potential employer may
perceive that applicant as litigious, and she'll never know-although she
may suspect-that her participation in earlier litigation is the basis for
her rejection today. Courts should strive to prevent physical harm to po-
tential plaintiffs, but in today's technological age courts must recognize
the very real non-physical harms that can result from publicity. It is im-
portant for courts to consider such scenarios when evaluating requests for
pseudonymity.
Recently, the Southern District of New York recognized that eco-
nomic harm is often concomitant with, and often inseparable from,
physical harm, and both can result when the plaintiff's privacy is not pro-
tected.235 In OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe International, Inc.,236
shareholders brought suit alleging that a corporation committed securities
fraud and violated RICO 237 by inducing investors to participate in a
Ponzi scheme. The court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed anony-
mously after they demonstrated that they could be in danger should their
identities become known.238 It concluded that there existed "a genuine
risk of retaliation involving economic and physical harm to plaintiffs
who are identified.,
239
Even plaintiffs whose very livelihood is at the mercy of their em-
ployer have had their hopes for pseudonymity dashed.24 ° In Does I
Through XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., a group of migrant farm work-
ers moved to sue their employer pseudonymously for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA") because they feared that if their
identities were disclosed they would be fired, arrested, and deported.24'
The trial court denied their motion, stating that "[m]any of the fears re-
volve around economic retaliation which is not sufficient to support
anonymous proceedings. 242 Apparently unaware of the small comfort
this remedy would offer a migrant farm worker who had been deported,
234. See Drake v. Colo. State Univ., Nos. 97-1076, 97-1077, 1998 WL 614474 (10th Cir. Sept.
8, 1998) (involving a plaintiff who claimed he was denied employment based on his previous acts of
filing discrimination suits).
235. OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Int'l, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 8993, 2003 WL 23313, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2003).
236. Id. at*l.
237. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2003).
238. 2003 WL 23313, at *2.
239. Id.
240. However, one district court allowed plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously to protect them
"from possible reprisal actions" but stated that, "[s]hould it appear at any time that defendants are
prejudiced by this order in obtaining any necessary discovery, the Court will re-examine its ruling."
Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106, 107 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
241. 214 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000).
242. Id. at 1064.
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the trial court contended that pseudonymity was unnecessary because the
plaintiffs had other protections against retaliation, including the "FLSA's
prohibition on employer retaliation against employees who file labor
complaints. 243 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the trial court, not-
ing that permitting the employees to bring their action under fictitious
names would "serve the public's interest in [the action] by enabling it to
go forward.",244 In light of the extensive damage that can result from ero-
sions of personal privacy, a broader interpretation of what constitutes
"injury" is now necessary. Not only should physical harm be considered
when determining whether to permit a particular plaintiff to bring his
claim anonymously, but financial and emotional harm ought to be con-
sidered as well. Specialized judges and magistrates should recognize
that loss of privacy can inflict devastating non-physical injuries and
should consider this when making decisions regarding plaintiff pseudo-
nymity.
2. Whether the Plaintiff is Challenging Governmental Activity
The incomparable power of the government, its ability to share pri-
vate information with other government entities, the costs of litigation,
and the fear of retribution that can come with suing the government are
all deterrents to would-be plaintiffs. As one scholar of privacy rights
noted, in describing his personal experience of being under the surveil-
lance of and investigated by the police, "[w]e are all watched, we are all
243. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2003)).
244. Id. at 1073. Additionally, the district court in the Western District of New York permitted
migrant farm workers to sue their employer for violations of the FLSA, the Migrant and Seasonal
Agriculture Worker Protection Act ("MSAWPA"), RICO, and various New York state statutes.
Javier H. v. Garcia-Botello, 211 F.R.D. 194 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). The plaintiffs in that case were afraid
of threats of violence against them previously made by the defendants. Specifically, the plaintiffs
noted that a grand jury had charged the defendants with serious crimes arising out of the same facts
underlying the defendants' civil suit and argued that revealing their true identities would "adversely
affect their ability to aid the Government" in its prosecution of the criminal charges. Id. at 196. The
district court analyzed the five primary factors and concluded that, given the threats of violence in
the past and the clear willingness of the defendants to carry through with those threats, the plaintiffs'
privacy interests were "substantial" and "outweigh[ed] the customary and constitutionally-embedded
presumption of openness in judicial proceedings." Id. (citing Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361
(N.D.N.Y. 1998)). The court acknowledged that the public would remain "substantially informed"
about the relevant facts of the case "through [the] prosecution of the criminal charges." Id. The
court then noted that, were there to come a point in the proceedings that in the interests of fairness
the plaintiffs would be "called upon to publicly stand behind their claims" the court would be "open
to motions by Defendants" to revisit the issue of anonymity. Id.
2004]
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angry, and we are all afraid. And we are increasingly without a language
to speak about it.",
245
In EW v. New York Blood Center, a woman sought anonymously to
bring a tort action against the blood bank from which she contracted
hepatitis B. 246 Chief Judge Korman of the Eastern District of New York
analogized the public function of the New York Blood Center to that of a
government entity and stated that in such actions "personal anonymity is
more readily granted because of the existence of a public interest in the
,,247
action. He noted that when a plaintiff seeks to pursue an action
against governmental activity, she will probably represent a minority
interest and there is likely a public interest in the vindication of her
rights.248 Likewise, in Yacovelli v. Moeser,24 freshmen at the University
of North Carolina Chapel Hill ("UNC") challenged the school's assign-
ment of a portion of a book entitled "Approaching the Qur'an, The Early
Revelations." The students alleged that the inclusion of the book in
UNC's curriculum intruded upon the Free Exercise Clause and consti-
tuted an endorsement of Islam °.25  The court reviewed the five factors
and permitted the students to proceed pseudonymously, stating, inter alia,
"[w]hen a plaintiff challenges the government or government activity,
courts are more like[ly] to permit plaintiffs to proceed under a pseudo-
nym."25'
In contrast, in Doe v. Beaumont Independent School District, stu-
dents and their parents brought an action challenging the constitutionality
of the school district's program "Clergy in Schools." 252 While the court
acknowledged that the plaintiffs were indeed challenging governmental
action, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to proceed pseudony-
mously, stating that "'in only a very few cases challenging governmental
245. JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE AND THE LIMITS
OF PRIVACY 150 (2001).
246. 213 F.R.D. 108, 109 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
247. ld. atl12.
248. Id. In Free Speech v. Reno, the plaintiffs, in addition to contending that proceeding under
their true identities would expose them to criminal prosecution, argued that by suing a governmental
agency (the FCC) they should be permitted to sue anonymously. No. 98 Civ. 2680, 1999 WL 47310,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1999). The government countered that the plaintiffs were not challenging "a
governmental activity per se because they [were seeking] to vindicate their own interests and not
those of the public." Id. at *2. The court noted that the government's argument was "immaterial,"
because "[t]he fact that the defendants are government entities rather than private defendants is
significant because governmental bodies do not share the concerns about 'reputation' that private
persons have when they are publicly charged with wrongdoing." Id. at *2.
249. No. 1:02CV596, 2004 WL 1144183 (M.D.N.C. May 20, 2004).
250. Id. at *2.
251. Id.at*8.
252. 172 F.R.D. 215 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
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activity can anonymity be justified.' '253 This sentiment was echoed by
the District Court of the District of Columbia, which denied a Nigerian
citizen's motion pseudonymously to sue the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service's denial of her application for authorization to work in the
United States.254
Recognition of the importance of ensuring all citizens a voice with
which to challenge governmental actions, and the reluctance of many to
do so for fear of reprisal, warrants liberal permission by the courts to
permit plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously when suing governmental
agencies.
3. Whether the Plaintiff Would Be Compelled to Admit Her Intention
to Engage in Illegal Conduct, Thereby Risking Criminal Prosecution
Although it has not been explicitly labeled as such, this factor ap-
pears to be connected to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, because, in essence, it protects a would-be plaintiff from
incriminating himself. As such, most courts have properly held that a
plaintiff forced to admit her intention to engage in illegal conduct should
be permitted to proceed anonymously. In Free Speech v. Reno, the
plaintiffs sought permission to proceed under a pseudonym because they
feared that disclosure of their identities would subject them to criminal
prosecution. 255 Judge Mukasy of the Southern District of New York
agreed, stating that "such exposure [to criminal prosecution] is not re-
quired by Rule 10(a). 256 In Doe v. Miller, illegal aliens sought a pre-
liminary injunction to prevent the Illinois Department of Public Aid from
implementing a policy that would force them either to withdraw applica-
tions for food stamps for their children or disclose their illegal alien
status to the INS, thereby risking deportation. 257 The court, without dis-
253. Id. at 216 (quoting Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981)).
254. O-J-R v. Ashcroft, 216 F.R.D. 150, 151 (D.D.C. 2003). In Doe v. City of New York, the
plaintiff brought a civil rights action against the city and sought to remain anonymous. 201 F.R.D.
100 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The plaintiff had disputed with a taxicab driver, who claimed that she did not
pay her fare and who therefore called the police. The Southern District stated that the fact that the
plaintiff was challenging a governmental activity "appear[ed] to cut against her position" because
the governmental activity indicated "a public interest in the facts of the incident at issue as opposed
merely to a public interest in the knowledge of the manner in which the courts function in resolving
issues." Id. at 102.
See also Judge Gee's dissent in Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d at 189, in which he states that
when the defendant is the government, "there is something to be said... for the notion that one who
strikes the king should do so unmasked or not at all."
255. No. 98 Civ. 2680, 1999 WL 47310, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1999).
256. Id. at *3.
257. 573 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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cussion, permitted the plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously, noting that
doing so would protect their "rights under the Fifth Amendment." 258
Thus, this factor appears to need little attention.
4. Whether the Plaintiff Would Be Required to Disclose Information of
the Utmost Intimacy
This factor is the most complex but also the most directly related to
privacy concerns. A wide constellation of issues now exist, including,
but certainly not limited to, plaintiffs with HIV and hepatitis infections,
plaintiffs who have been raped, homosexual or transgender plaintiffs,
plaintiffs with mental illness, and plaintiffs with an intimate physical in-
jury or deformity. 259 Frequently plaintiffs dealing with these issues face
long, difficult, and arbitrary decisions regarding their requests to bring
their actions anonymously. These claimants may hesitate to pursue their
actions at all for fear of having their private matters made public. A
more just and efficient manner by which specialized judges or magis-
trates should evaluate pseudonymity requests by these plaintiffs is to fol-
low a rule-based approach. For example, plaintiffs whose privacy con-
cerns fall into certain objectively intimate categories (such as HIV status
or rape) would automatically be permitted to proceed pseudonymously.
Those with more subjective privacy concerns, such as fear of general
embarrassment or employer reprisal, would be evaluated against the
260standards in the community.
258. Id.at464n.l.
259. See, e.g., Roe v. Johnson, 334 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2004) (permitting
plaintiff to sue anonymously because, "the plaintiff's privacy concerns related to her mental health
outweighed the presumption of openness."); Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D.
464, 468 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (allowing plaintiff with psychiatric and mental disorders to proceed pseu-
donymously due to potential for stigmatization); Doe v. Alexian Bros. Med. Ctr., No. 96 C 2042,
1996 WL 210074, at *1 (N.D. 111. Apr. 25, 1996) (granting plaintiffs motion to proceed under a
pseudonym because of plaintiff's claim that "he would face harassment and stigmatization if it was
made public that he had been tested for HIV out of a belief that he was HIV infected."); Doe v. Bell
Atl. Bus. Sys. Serv., 162 F.R.D. 418 (D. Mass. 1995) (denying plaintiff's motion to proceed pseudo-
nymously in Title VII claim of hostile work environment); Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 887 F.
Supp. 1249, 1256 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (allowing child plaintiff with severe cardiac and respiratory
conditions to sue pseudonymously to enjoin various state activities which would aggravate her con-
ditions); Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 794 F. Supp. 72, 73 (D.R.I. 1992) (allowing plain-
tiff to sue under a pseudonym because of his transsexuality).
260. Much scholarly discussion about the benefits of legal rules versus legal standards exists.
E.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976); Russell B. Korobkin, Behaviorial Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited,
79 OR. L. REV. 23, 28 (2000); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 645 (1991); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
Rules require a particular legal result that arises from one or more eliciting events, while stan-
dards, in contrast, involve the application by adjudicators of certain principles to specific facts in
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Because some areas of one's personal life are intrinsically intimate, it
benefits both individuals and society for courts automatically to shield
these areas under the protection of plaintiff anonymity. Proceeding this
way offers a more consistent and fair method by which cases involving
intimate and personal issues, and the variations and complexities they
often entail, should be evaluated. This will protect plaintiffs with legiti-
mate claims from being forced to choose between bringing their actions
and forgoing their rights for fear of losing their privacy.
5. Whether the Party Defending Against a Suit Brought Under a Pseu-
donym Would Be Prejudiced
While weighing fairness considerations and determining whether the
defendant will be prejudiced if the plaintiff is permitted to bring her ac-
tion pseudonymously, several courts have examined whether the defen-
dant "would be placed at a serious disadvantage [if] he would be required
to defend himself publicly while plaintiff could make her accusations
from behind a cloak of anonymity. '261 In publishing detailed particulars
about their decisions regarding motions by plaintiffs to proceed pseudo-
nymously, these courts may actually exacerbate or even cause injury to
the defendant. In Doe v. Wolowitz,26 2 for example, the plaintiff claimed
she was sexually abused by the defendant, her treating psychologist.
261
The court published the defendant's full name (Howard Wolowitz), 264 his
occupation (psychologist), 265 his employer (the University of Michi-
order to reach a legal determination. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 58 (1992). Scholars have often debated "which legal form is substantively
more desirable in different circumstances, usually by comparing the costs and benefits of the com-
peting forms." Korobkin at 23-24. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has argued in favor of a
rule-based approach to the law, because, he argues, "the trouble with the discretion-conferring ap-
proach to judicial law making is that it does not satisfy [the] sense of justice very well." Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178 (1989). It is much better,
Scalia adds, "to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the
decision." Id. If the opposite were true, Justice Scalia opines, then a judge would be engaged in
deciding issues based on "the totality of the circumstances" or "balancing" tests in which "he begins
to resemble a finder of fact more than a determiner of law." Id. at 1182. Thus, "[t]o reach such a
stage is, in a way, a regrettable concession of defeat-an acknowledgment that we have passed the
point where 'law,' properly speaking, has any further application." Id. at 1182.
261. See, e.g., Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Doe v. Hartz, 52 F.
Supp. 2d 1027, 1048 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (finding "considerable appeal to the defendants' argument
that they should not be held up to public ridicule while their accuser remains anonymous, when it is
the accuser who has focused public attention on the circumstances she finds embarrassing").
262. No. 01-73907, 2002 WL 1310614 (E.D. Mich. May 28, 2002).





gan), 66 and the charges brought against him (sexual abuse), 67 and then
denied the plaintiff's motion to bring the action anonymously. Ulti-
mately, this left the allegations about Mr. Wolowitz out in the open for
all who cared to know without Mr. Wolowitz having a chance to defend
himself publicly. When courts publish these types of allegations in the
course of evaluating whether to permit the action to be brought by a
pseudonymous plaintiff, the defendant's name often becomes intertwined
with serious allegations.268  If the court decides that the prejudice to the
defendant would be too great if the plaintiff were permitted to proceed
anonymously, the court will dismiss the plaintiffs request for anonym-
ity. However, the allegations against the defendant (such as those
against Howard Wolowitz) remain public in perpetuity and can cast a
shadow over a defendant's reputation. Ironically, the defendant may
hope the plaintiff pursues the case even though not permitted to do so
anonymously, giving the defendant the opportunity to publicly defend
himself and clear his name.
In light of the above, courts concerned about fairness to defendants
should be more liberal in permitting plaintiffs to bring their actions pseu-
donymously. Doing so will enable defendants to defend the charges
brought against them and avoid the publication of unsubstantiated allega-
269tions. Concerns about prejudice to the defendant should not be a part
of the initial calculation to determine plaintiff pseudonymity. Instead,
after deciding that a particular plaintiff is permitted to proceed anony-
mously, courts should examine potential prejudices against the defen-
dant. Options should then be explored to prevent such prejudices from
occurring.270
266. Id. at *2.
267. Id. at* 1
268. See, e.g., id. (sexual abuse); Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (sexual as-
sault); Doe v. Ind. Black Expo, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 137 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (employment discrimina-
tion); United States v. Bateman, 805 F. Supp. 1058 (D.N.H. 1992) (possession of child pornogra-
phy); Doe v. Hallock, 119 F.R.D. 640 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (sexual harassment).
269. Of course, one way for courts to avoid this problem is simply to not publish sensitive opin-
ions. This can lead to a slippery slope, however, in that more and more of these cases become se-
cret. Society loses the benefit of having access to the proceedings in the action, and the result is a
chilling effect on the public's access to the workings of the judicial system.
270. One way to do this might be to instruct the jury that plaintiff's use of a pseudonym should
not be construed as a reflection of the validity of the plaintiffs case. See, e.g., Doe v. N.C. Cent.
Univ., No. 1:98CV01095, 1999 WL 1939248, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 15, 1999) (mem) (holding that
the jury should be instructed not to make any assumptions regarding the court's decision to permit
the plaintiff to use a fictitious name). Another mechanism to avoid prejudice to the defendant is to
permit the defendant also to proceed pseudonymously. After plaintiffs are permitted to proceed
anonymously, preventing prejudice to the defendant is an important consideration that requires addi-
tional research.
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C. Additional Factors that Courts Should Examine When Analyzing
Whether to Grant PlaintiffAnonymity
As demonstrated, the original five factors, in their current form, are
no longer adequate tools to determine which plaintiffs should be entitled
to proceed pseudonymously. In addition to the changes to the existing
factors that I have recommended, I propose that several factors be con-
sidered when a plaintiff wishes to bring an action anonymously. These
include: (1) whether the plaintiff has already been identified publicly
regarding the matter at issue in the underlying case; (2) whether the
plaintiff will bring the suit if not permitted to be anonymous; and (3) the
precedential value of the action.
1. Whether the Plaintiff Has Already Been Identified Publicly
Regarding the Matter at Issue in the Underlying Case
Plaintiffs seeking to have their claims heard pseudonymously should
be required, as a threshold matter, to attest to the fact that their identity
has not publicly been disclosed regarding the issues involved in the mat-
ter in which they seek to remain anonymous. Having this threshold rule
will save judicial resources and discourage disingenuous plaintiffs from
trying to proceed pseudonymously. If the plaintiff already has been iden-
tified publicly, privacy concerns regarding the plaintiffs identity are no
longer relevant. Concerns about the publication of other intimate infor-
mation about the plaintiff not relevant to the litigation, however, such as
her gambling habits when the action is for breach of contract, might still
bewarranted. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the propriety of
the disclosure of such information if the plaintiff is not granted pseudo-
nymity is also an important concern.
Some courts have recognized the importance of determining whether
the plaintiff has already been identified publicly. Not all of these courts,
however, have treated this as a threshold issue. For example, Judge Chin
of the Southern District of New York stressed that the Shakur case was
"a difficult one" in which to decide whether the plaintiff should be per-
mitted to proceed anonymously. 271 He reviewed the five basic factors,
discussed above in Part VI, and ultimately denied the plaintiffs motion
to proceed anonymously.272 Even a cursory review of the Shakur opin-
ion, however, reveals that Judge Chin considered the fact that the plain-
271. Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
272. See id. (finding that plaintiff should "be prepared to stand behind her charges publicly").
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tiff was already known to the press to be the definitive reason to deny her
motion for pseudonymity. "Indeed, plaintiff makes it clear that the press
has been aware of both her residence and her place of employment.
Hence, her identity is not unknown., 273
In another case, Doe v. Bell Atlantic Business Systems Services,274
the plaintiff alleged that she was sexually assaulted by her employer and
later fired as a result of her allegation.275 The court discussed many fac-
tors that weighed in favor of permitting the plaintiff to proceed using a
pseudonym, noting that she was concerned that as a result of the assault
she might have been infected with HIV, that she was often despondent
and unable to work, and that if her identity was revealed she would "suf-
fer intense embarrassment and shame within her community. 276 How-
ever, notwithstanding all of the elements which militated toward granting
the plaintiff her anonymity request, the court ultimately denied her re-
quest, stating that "because plaintiffs true identity was revealed in ad-
ministrative proceedings, the request for anonymity is effectively
moot.
27 7
Judicial resources should not be wasted in conducting a balancing
test when the plaintiff has been previously publicly identified. Making
this issue a threshold matter will eliminate lengthy and inefficient judi-
cial examinations in situations where privacy concerns no longer apply,
273. Id. at 362.
274. 162 F.R.D. 418 (D. Mass. 1995).
275. Id. at 419-20.
276. Id. at 421.
277. Id. at 422.
In Rhode Island, a man sought anonymously to sue his former domestic partner to stop his al-
leged harassment and threats. Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090 (R.I. 2002). The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court's decision to permit the plaintiff to proceed under a pseudo-
nym, pointing to the fact that the plaintiff had initially brought the action using his real name and did
not seek to proceed anonymously until he was forced to defend counterclaims that his former partner
brought against him. Id. at 1092, 1097-98. The court noted that, "[riegardless of whether one or
both parties may have been entitled to proceed under a pseudonym ab initio, plaintiff should not
have been allowed to unring the bell that he had been tolling for approximately nine months after he
began this lawsuit in his own name." Id. at 1095. Although the court acknowledged that one's
status as a homosexual could be deemed to be a matter of the utmost intimacy that might warrant
proceeding under a pseudonym, the court concluded that the plaintiff had waived any claim to such
anonymity by disclosing his homosexual status in prior pleadings. Id. at 1097.
Likewise, in MM v. Zavaras, the court denied the plaintiffs motion to proceed anonymously,
noting that "it is readily apparent ... that in fact the plaintiffs identity is already known." 139 F.3d
798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998). In Mateer v. Ross, Suchoff Egert, Hankin Maidenbaum & Mazel, P.C.,
the court denied the plaintiff's request to proceed pseudonymously, stating:
The defendants in the present action sued Gary C. in the state court case under his full
name .... Any shield of privacy provided by allowing Gary C. to proceed anonymously
in the present case would therefore be a flimsy one, because any interested person could
learn his identity by investigating documents available in the state court public files.
No. 96 Civ. 1756(LAP), 1997 WL 171011, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1997).
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and preserve those instances in which plaintiff pseudonymity is appro-
piate.
2. Whether the Plaintiff Will Bring the Suit if not Permitted to Be
Pseudonymous
I suggest that all courts acknowledge, and incorporate into the
method by which they determine who should be permitted to proceed
anonymously, that to deny certain plaintiffs the right to proceed under a
pseudonym will prevent those plaintiffs from receiving justice. This
should be the next consideration that the specialized judge or magistrate
examines in making her recommendation to the court hearing the merits
of the underlying case. Some courts already have recognized the stifling
effect on the pursuit of justice that the modem erosion of privacy has
manifested. For example, in Doe v. Smith the plaintiff sought pseudo-
nymously to sue her psychiatrist, alleging that the psychiatrist assaulted,
molested, and sexually abused her in the course of providing psychiatric
treatment.278 The court examined "the public interest in guaranteeing
open access to proceedings without denying litigants access to the justice
system. ' '279 Although the trial court initially declined to permit the plain-
tiff to proceed anonymously,280 upon rehearing the court reversed its po-
sition, stating that
plaintiff's doctor has predicted that she will be unable to pursue this ac-
tion should she not be allowed to proceed anonymously. . . . [T]he
plaintiff has presented particularized and undisputed evidence that pro-
ceeding publicly would seriously threaten her mental health, requiring
her to choose between dropping her action and placing her life in jeop-
ardy.281
The Fourth Circuit emphasized this concern in James v. Jacobson282 as
well, stating that "in view of plaintiffs' entirely reasonable position that
they will not proceed except under pseudonyms-[the result] is effec-
278. 189 F.R.D. 239, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated upon reconsideration, 105 F. Supp. 2d 40
(E.D.N.Y. 1999), dismissed on other grounds, No. 98-CV-6600, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24974
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2001).
279. Id. at 242, 244.
280. Id. at 245.
281. 105 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (citations omitted).
282. 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993).
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tively to cut off a claim that, if proven, is obviously one of great civil
wrong.,
283
Likewise, specialized judges and magistrates should pay particular
attention to those plaintiffs who claim that publicity would inflict the
very injury they seek to avoid.284 These types of plaintiffs are particu-
larly vulnerable to choosing to forgo their quests for justice in order to
protect their privacy. In Doe v. Alaska,285 the plaintiffs sought to chal-
lenge Alaska's Sex Offender Registration provisions, which required
convicted sex offenders to register in the community in which they live.
The court reversed the lower court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion, stat-
ing that "disclosure [of their names] will deny [plaintiffs] the very relief
they seek., 286 The court noted that
[t]he issues raised are purely legal and do not depend on identifying the
specific plaintiffs. None of the values protected by public access will
be hindered by the use of pseudonyms. The public, as well as the plain-
tiffs, will benefit when the case proceeds to a resolution on the mer-
its.
2 87
283. Id. at 242.
284. In Doe v. Fellows, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the lower court's denial of
plaintiff's motion to pursue his claim using a pseudonym, No. 89-15869, 1991 WL 27453, at *1 (9th
Cir. Mar. 5, 1991) (unpublished disposition). In that case, the plaintiff was stopped by police be-
cause his car matched the description of a vehicle that had been involved in a hit and rn. He al-
leged that he was unlawfully "detained without probable cause or reasonable suspicion because he
refused to identify himself." Id. The plaintiff further claimed that the police officers illegally
searched his car and other belongings and placed him in custody for psychiatric evaluation. After
the police released him the plaintiff contended that they refused to return his car and other belong-
ings based on his continued refusal to identify himself. Id.
The court quoted Judge Sneed, who, in his dissent in United States v. Doe, noted that "[t]here is
some logic in cooperating to provide anonymity when publicity would inflict the very injury the
litigant seeks to avoid by resort to the courts." Id. at *2 (quoting Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 930 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1980) (Sneed, J., dissenting)).
See also Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In Ingraham, patients and their
physicians brought an action challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the New York
State Controlled Substances Act, which required physicians who prescribed certain medications
deemed to be "Schedule II drugs" to file with the state a form containing, inter alia, the patient's
name address and age. Id. at 538-39. The plaintiffs objected to the recording of their names and
prescribed medications, alleging that such disclosure violated their rights of privacy and confidenti-
ality. Id. at 540. The court permitted the patients to bring their claims under a pseudonym, ac-
knowledging that "if plaintiffs are required to reveal their identity prior to the adjudication on the
merits of their privacy claim, they will already have sustained the injury which by this litigation they
seek to avoid." Id. at 541 n.7.
285. 1997 WL 547941, at *1 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished disposition), appeal upon remand sub
noma., Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. 84 (2003).
286. Id.
287. Id. See also Doe v. State, 92 P.3d 398 (Alaska 2004) (permitting sex offender to challenge,
under pseudonym, Alaska's sex offender statute, stating merely "John Doe is a pseudonym.").
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This is in stark contrast to the sex offender plaintiff in Femedeer v.
288thHaun, where the court denied the plaintiffs request to proceed
anonymously because his identity was already publicly known.289
An essential goal of the judicial system should be to remain an ac-
cessible institution for the public. In light of this, courts must recognize
that plaintiffs might be compelled to choose to forgo their actions for fear
of having their privacy violated. It should be the specialized judge or
magistrate's duty to determine whether denial of a plaintiffs motion to
bring her action pseudonymously will in effect constitute denial of access
to the judicial system. The ever-increasing loss of privacy in today's
society, due to modem technology, should be offset by permitting more
plaintiffs with meritorious privacy concerns to proceed anonymously.
3. The Precedential Value of the Action
In conjunction with examining whether the plaintiff will bring the
action if not permitted to be pseudonymous, a specialized judge or mag-
istrate should evaluate the precedential value of having the case heard.
Once she finds that the plaintiff will not bring the suit if not permitted to
do so anonymously, she should then examine the precedential value of
the merits of the suit, taking into account the jurisdiction in which the
case has been brought and the likelihood of similar cases being brought
in that jurisdiction in the future.
The Kansas Supreme Court recently was called upon to decide
whether a plaintiff with herpes could pseudonymously bring suit against
his former fiancde who infected him with the disease.290  The court
looked to Kansas statutes, which, like the federal rules, state that the cap-
tion of a complaint "shall include the names of all the parties.' 291 In re-
viewing decisions that have interpreted the rules, the Kansas Supreme
Court noted that section 60-210(a) "should not act as an absolute bar to
suits identifying a plaintiff by a pseudonym., 292 The court, however,
determined that "basic fairness" dictated that the plaintiff was required to
proceed using his real name.293 Although the court indicated that the
plaintiff did not specify that he would not pursue the action if not permit-
288. 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000).
289. Id. at 1246.
290. Unwitting Victim v. C.S., 273 Kan. 937, 47 P.3d 392 (2002).
291. Id. at 940, 396 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-210(a) (2002)).
292. Id. at 944, 398.
293. Id. at 949, 401 (quoting S. Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne &
Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979)).
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ted to proceed pseudonymously,294 there is no indication in the opinion
that the court considered the jurisprudential value of having the merits of
the case decided.
As a result, the Kansas Supreme Court missed an opportunity to de-
cide a socially valuable precedent for the state.295 To date there is no
case in Kansas that indicates whether a person in a consensual sexual
relationship has a right to recover in a civil action against another who
transmits to him or her a sexually transmitted disease when the transmit-
ter (i) knew that she was a carrier of the disease and (ii) chose not to dis-
close it to her partner. Thus, by being concerned with the importance of
having "an open judicial system," the court in fact did a disservice to the
294. Id. at 948, 401.
295. Another example of a case with important precedential impact is Free Speech v. Reno, No.
98 Civ. 2680, 1999 WL 147743 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1999), afid, 200 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1999). The
court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously in a previous proceeding, and as a result,
the case went to trial. See Free Speech v. Reno, No. 98 Civ. 2680, 1999 WL 47310, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 1, 1999). Free Speech involved producers of a low-power radio station in New York City who
were operating without an FCC license. Free Speech, 1999 WL 147743, at * 1.
Application to the FCC for a license would have been futile, according to the plaintiffs, because
the FCC does not issue licenses for stations that broadcast at less than 100 watts of power. Id. The
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §
301 et seq., claiming, inter alia, that the Act was overbroad, created a system of formal and informal
prior restraints, and violated the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Free Speech, 1999 WL
147743, at *1. The government moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim.
Id. Judge Mukasy of the Southern District of New York granted the government's motion to dis-
miss, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the action was not ripe, and the plaintiff sustained
no injury in fact. Id. at *4-5, * 11. The Second Circuit affirmed in Free Speech ex rel. Ruggiero v.
Reno. 200 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1999). Although the plaintiffs ultimately lost their case, this was an
important decision that might not have come about had Judge Mukasy not permitted the plaintiffs to
proceed psuedonymously in the first place.
To date, seven decisions have cited to the District Court's opinion in the Free Speech case. See,
e.g., Ruggiero v. F.C.C., 317 F.3d 239, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Tsabbar v. Booth, 293 F. Supp. 2d
328, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Cuevas, No. 3:99CV1261, 2000 WL 852308, at *3 (D.
Conn. Mar. 31, 2000); United States v. Girona, No. 3:99CV1262, 2000 WL 565496, at *3 (D. Conn.
Mar. 27, 2000); Conboy v. AT&T Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 492, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v.
Waterbury Hispanic Communications, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 80, 82 (D. Conn. 1999); In re Jerry
Szoka Cleveland, Ohio, 14 F.C.C.R. 9857, 9863 (1999).
Thirteen decisions have cited to the Second Circuit's affirmation. See, e.g., Ruggiero, 317 F.3d
at 249; United States v. Neset, 235 F.3d 415, 421 (8th Cir. 2000); Prayze FM v. F.C.C., 214 F.3d
245, 250 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Any and All Radio Station Equip., 204 F.3d 658, 666 (6th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Any and All Radio Station Transmission Equip., No. 00 Civ. 893, 2004
WL 2848532, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2004); Tsabbar, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 336; Prayze FM v. United
States, No. 3:98CV375, 2001 WL 34118028, at *3 (D. Corn. Jun. 13, 2001); United States v. Any
and All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Cuevas, 2000 WL 852308,
at *3; Girona, 2000 WL 565496, at *3; United States v. Any and All Radio Station Equip., No.
3:00CV245, 2000 WL 488491, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 29, 2000); Conboy, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 502; In re
Valentin, 15 F.C.C.R. 5355 (2000).
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legal community by failing to take an opportunity to address and resolve
an important legal issue.296
In contrast, due in part to the testimony of the James family in the
Jacobson case, 297 Jacobson was convicted of fifty-two counts of fraud
and perjury following a trial by jury.29 8 Additionally, at least six civil
suits have been filed against Jacobson by the parents of children Jacob-
son allegedly fathered. 299 The civil suits alleged various wrongs on the
part of Jacobson, including fraud, battery, negligence, negligent infliction
of emotional distress and medical malpractice. Had the Fourth Circuit
not permitted the James family to bring its action anonymously, the
plaintiffs in these subsequent suits may have chosen not to come for-
ward.
The value to society in having cases with significant precedential
merit heard should not be overlooked. Permitting certain plaintiffs in
these cases to proceed pseudonymously will provide an opportunity for
these important matters to be examined. In this way, plaintiffs who pre-
viously may not have brought their claims because of privacy concerns
now will have their day in court.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Internet and current technology have had a profound effect upon
modem society. Their impact on the judicial system should no longer be
ignored. Before Google, courts were reluctant to permit plaintiffs to
bring their actions pseudonymously. Judicial openness trumped most
privacy concerns. Now, because the electronic age has made personal
296. Conversely, in Heather K. v. City of Mallard, the district court held that an ordinance regu-
lating open burning constituted a program, service or activity under the ADA, and that the city could
be liable under the ADA if the ordinance negatively affected persons with disabilities from taking
advantage of city services. 887 F. Supp. 1249, 1261-63 (N.D. Iowa 1995). To date, this case has
been cited as precedent by six other cases regarding alleged ADA violations and might not have
been heard on the merits at all had the plaintiffs been denied permission to bring the case pseudony-
mously. See, e.g., Hahn ex rel. Barta v. Linn County, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D. Iowa 2001);
Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 993 F. Supp. 861, 868 (D. Wyo. 1998); Coonley v. Fortis Ben.
Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 841, 844 n.2 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Kane v. Iowa Dep't of Human Serv., 955 F.
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information easily accessible, this calculus must be revised. Public ac-
cess to private information may have great personal impact, and hence a
chilling effect on public participation in the judicial system. A more lib-
eral approach to evaluating requests for plaintiff pseudonymity is there-
fore needed. The five traditional factors used to weigh plaintiffs' privacy
concerns must be examined and updated to reflect current technological
change. Likewise, new criteria-whether the plaintiff has already been
publicly identified, whether the plaintiff is likely to bring the claim if not
permitted to be pseudonymous, and the precedential value of the ac-
tion-should be introduced to reinforce and supplement those criteria
presently in use. Also, a specialized judge or magistrate should oversee
the process of evaluating such requests. This will standardize a practice
which is currently ad hoc and unpredictable. Increased plaintiff pseudo-
nymity, within the parameters discussed in this Article, will counterbal-
ance the advancement of information technologies' increasing intrusion
on privacy rights and will protect against a chilling effect on the admini-
stration of justice.
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